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Moscow knew that if the reforms in Poland survived, a contagion of democracy could sweep through the satellites and finally threaten the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet leaders could not permit this to happen. In the Polish crisis, we were not seeing the collapse of the Soviet empire. Moscow's difficulties with the Poles were a sign of trouble and decay, but the situation was not irreversible. Solidarity could be snuffed out. There was never any question that the popular movement in Poland would be crushed by the U.S.S.R. The only questions were: When would this happen, and with what degree of brutality?
In the councils of the Administration, I spoke of postponing the day and of minimizing the brutality by discouraging direct intervention by Soviet troops. To some of the President's other advisers, these policies were not sufficiently redblooded, despite the fact that the U.S. alone hadn't the military power or the interrelated diplomatic influence to go further. It was clear that some of my colleagues on the National Security Council were prepared to look beyond Poland, as if it were not in itself an issue of war and peace, and regard it as an opportunity to inflict mortal political, economic and propaganda damage on the U.S.S.R.
The Polish situation was heavy with the possibility of death and repression on a horrifying scale. Ever since the hand of Russia fell on Eastern Europe at the end of World War II, many have predicted that the satellites would one day rise up and "roll back Communism." In 1956, the freedom fighters of Hungary had battled Soviet tanks in the streets, but the U.S. had not rescued them. This memory was a stark warning to us. If the Poles were to rise in response to what they took to be a signal of encouragement from Washington and fight their own government or the Soviet army or both, the outcome could be no different.
I detected no willingness on the part of the hard-liners around the Cabinet table or in the NSC to risk international conflict or shed American blood over Poland, nor would any rational official have advocated such a policy. Rather, these men seemed to imagine that the U.S. could control Soviet behavior toward Poland, or even defeat her purposes, through the application of economic and trade sanctions that would "bring her to her knees."
This was questionable. Total American trade with the U.S.S.R. amounts to much less than 1% of the Soviet gross national product. Nor had the U.S. displayed the willingness and ability to use very effectively what economic leverage it had. In April 1981, the Administration misplayed the strongest card it held when President Reagan lifted the grain embargo against the Soviet Union. President Carter had embargoed the sale of U.S. agricultural products to the U.S.S.R. in January 1980 in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the campaign, Reagan had promised to lift it. Secretary of Agriculture John Block reminded him of that promise at the very first Cabinet meeting. With the support of Ed Meese, Block continued to press his case.
I would have opposed imposing the embargo in the first place. To use food as a weapon is bad policy. But now that the embargo was in place, lifting it involved worldwide consequences. Warsaw Pact troops were maneuvering along the