Alexander Haig

(13 of 19)

already heard that Sharon had visited Israel's Phalangist allies in Beirut. War seemed very near. Our duty to attempt to prevent it was obvious; our ability to do so, questionable. After informing the President of this latest development, I sent our Ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, to Begin with instructions to tell him that an Israeli operation along the lines described to us would have far-reaching consequences for our relationship. The Israelis should not misjudge American public opinion; it would not tolerate such an operation in current circumstances. Begin interrupted. "Don't use those words, Sam!" he pleaded. But after he had consulted the Cabinet, Begin said he and his colleagues had decided to accept my request for restraint. At this delicate juncture, Caspar Weinberger, on a tour of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Jordan, was reported to have stated that the U.S. needed more than one I friend in the Middle East and that the Administration might provide F-16 fighters and mobile Hawk antiaircraft missiles to Jordan. The Israelis were outraged. Begin wrote to the President: "I do not understand why it was necessary for the Secretary of Defense to make his worrying statements [while] visiting Arab countries that . . . but for one, are in a state of war with us." Neither did I.

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel signed on March 26, 1979, had obligated Israel to return the Sinai to Egypt. True to its word, Israel did so on April 25, 1982. This was, as I wrote to Begin, "an act of the utmost courage, statesmanship and vision . . . an inspiring example of the commitment of you and your government to the future." The Sinai issue settled, Israeli fixation on the threat from southern Lebanon intensified. On May 7, 1982, Begin sent us an oral message warning that it might well become "imperative and inevitable" to remove the threat.

The Administration was already divided over its policy toward Israel. The foreign policy bureaucracy, overwhelmingly Arabist in its approach to the Middle East and in its sympathies, saw the crisis as an opportunity to open direct negotiations between the U.S. and the P.L.O.

Now the cessation of hostilities itself was threatened. As tensions mounted, I repeatedly warned the President that we must act or face the consequences of war in the Middle East. On May 21, I sent the President a detailed plan of action and asked for an NSC meeting to discuss the plan before we left for a tour of Europe and the summit of industrialized democracies in Versailles eleven days later. But my efforts came to nothing—memoranda, telephone calls, confrontations with Bill Clark all failed to drive the message through the incoherent NSC system.

Late in May, while on an official visit to Washington, General Sharon shocked a roomful of State Department bureaucrats by sketching out two possible military campaigns: one that would pacify southern Lebanon, and a second that would rewrite the political map of Beirut in favor of the Christian Phalange. Sharon was putting the U.S. on notice: one more provocation and Israel would deliver a knockout blow to the P.L.O.

In a strenuous argument with Sharon in the presence of my staff, I challenged these plans, and after the meeting, so that there could be no question that I was playing to an audience, I invited Sharon into my office and told him