Playing Nuclear Poker

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could not be limited by SALT II. Schmidt was fearful that Jimmy Carter would sign a SALT II treaty that would let the SS-20 run free while restricting the introduction of new American weapons in Europe. in order to assure Schmidt's support for the embattled SALT II treaty and to make amends for a series of bungles on other European defense issues, the Carter Administration agreed in 1979 to the "two-track" approach. The U.S. would set about putting new missiles in Europe by 1983 unless it could reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. in the meantime that would reduce the Soviet nuclear threat in the region, preferably by cutting the number of SS-20s.

It was, from the outset, a risky and deeply flawed concept. The next round of SALT like the previous ones, was to be bilateral, between the two superpowers, with no chairs at the table for West European representatives. The U.S.S.R. has persistently tried to include British and French nuclear weapons on the agenda, but the U.S. is just as adamant about discussing only Soviet and American forces. Unlike the US.S.R.'s Warsaw Pact satellites, the U.S.'s NATO allies are truly sovereign states, and Britain and France have refused to let the U.S. bargain with their independent arsenals.

The Soviet missiles in question are entirely in the U.S.S.R., but the American ones are supposed to be deployed on the territory of third countries. That has given those countries a de facto veto over the American negotiating position since the U.S. cannot deploy missiles without the host nation's say-so. Moreover, it has presented the Soviets with a golden opportunity to play the U.S. off against its allies.

The Soviets have been only too eager to do so, expertly exploiting the homegrown angst and ambivalence in Europe. Much of the neutralism and anti-Americanism have been concentrated among the younger generation. Unlike their elders, they have no personal recollection of Americans as liberators of Western Europe or of Soviets as occupiers of Eastern Europe. Many of them have grown up taking their freedom, their prosperity and their American-backed security for granted.

The Reagan Administration inherited a policy and an alliance that would be troublesome even if managed with great skill and sensitivity. The Administration demonstrated neither, thereby making a bad situation considerably worse.

Following through on his campaign denunciations of SALT II as "fatally flawed," Reagan came into office hoping that he could set arms control aside until the U.S. had a chance to rearm. He decided to leave the treaty unratified, although he reluctantly went along with the State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff in committing the U.S. to continue abiding by its terms. So much for the West Europeans' hope that a new round of SALT might obviate the need for new American missiles in their countries. A series of official statements, leaked documents and new Pentagon programs suggested that the Administration took more seriously than any of its predecessors the feasibility of a "limited, protracted" nuclear war. The West Europeans feared that their countries might be the battlefield. Finally, Reagan's enthusiasm for a worldwide crusade against Soviet Communism, voiced during a trip to Europe last summer, could hardly have been less in tune with the growing nostalgia there for détente