Blackmailing the U.S.

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the Council on Foreign Relations have made perfectly clear their desire to have the Shah here." Such pressure not withstanding, the State Department flatly insisted last week that the purloined cables reflected the dialogue and debate of policymakers, and not established policy. The Administration's decision to admit the Shah temporarily for treatment, they said, was based on humanitarian grounds and nothing else.

President Carter was first informed of the seizure of the embassy as he was spending a quiet weekend at Camp David. He conferred by phone several times during the day with top advisers, including Vance and Brzezinski. The President was grim-faced when he arrived at the White House at 8:15 Monday morning; he promised newsmen a statement, but then decided to wait for further developments. Meanwhile, the National Security Council went into almost continuous session. Initially, Washington had been relieved to receive Prime Minister Bazargan's promise that he was ready to help. But Bazargan's position was weak—much weaker, perhaps, than Washington had realized.

He had tried to resign several times after taking office last February, because it was increasingly clear that Khomeini and his followers, not the government, ruled Iran.

In September, Bazargan told a television audience, "The government has been a knife with no blade." In an interview with Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci, he said: "Khomeini has never been a real politician. He's never had the training needed to face the administrative responsibilities that he now finds on his shoulders. In fact, he doesn't understand government, he doesn't know the techniques for administering a country." On Tuesday, realizing that Khomeini and his advisers were supporting the embassy siege, Bazargan at last resigned. He had been particularly stung when the students charged him with "treason" for having talked to the Americans, a cruel criticism of a politician who had fought the Shah for decades and spent years in prison as a result.

Although he dutifully supported the Ayatullah, Bazargan was strongly devoted to human rights, democracy and moderation. His resignation will reinforce the power of the ruling clergy, many of whom do not share his concern. The Bazargan government will be replaced by the Revolutionary Council, the quasi-legislative body of 15 members that Khomeini appointed while in exile in France last November. During the revolution the council quickly took over the levers of power —the network of komitehs, the revolutionary tribunals that have since ordered the execution of more than 600 people, and the Islamic guards. Now it will take over the government as well. At the same time, an "Assembly of Experts" is drawing up a new constitution that will establish Iran as a theocratic state. The constitution specifies that the state will be ruled by a "just, brave, popularly accepted theologian who is abreast of the times," and who will have the power to dissolve parliament, fire the President, and nullify any legislation he feels is contrary to Islamic law. Khomeini will surely decide that he himself has the necessary qualifications.

Some critics of Khomeini charge that one of his motives in inciting the students was to distract his country's attention from problems that his revolution has been unable