Blackmailing the U.S.

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the U.S. under any circumstances. But the students who attacked the U.S. mission were not political adventurers with a lonely, unpopular cause. They were citizens of a state that maintains diplomatic relations with the U.S. Their invasion of the embassy violated a principle of diplomatic immunity that even the most radical and hostile governments have professed to respect. Most important of all, their action was condoned—if not instigated—by Khomeini, Iran's de facto head of state and a leader who himself had sought and received political asylum in the West.

For the Administration—and for President Carter personally—the seizure of the embassy was a nightmare. At its very worst, it could lead to the deaths of the Americans, and endanger the 300 or so other U.S. citizens still in Iran—all of whom were advised by the State Department to leave the country as expeditiously as possible. However the crisis ends, it seems likely to enhance the impression of American helplessness.

That image is not merely the stuff from which demagoguery is made; it is also the serious preoccupation of political and military analysts who are fearful that an impression of U.S. impotence, however unfair or simplistic, may provoke other probes of the nation's will, other attacks.

In the long run, it could create a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to risk new adventures, ones with serious world implications.

That is the concern of former Secretary of Defense (and more recently, of Energy) James Schlesinger. In an interview last week with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Schlesinger described the fall of the Shah last January and the rise of Khomeini as "a cataclysm for American foreign policy—the first serious revolution since 1917 in terms of world impact." Said Schlesinger: "It is plain that respect for the U.S. would be higher if we didn't just fumble around continuously and weren't half-apologetic about whatever we do. An image of weakness is going to elicit this kind of behavior. Wild as the Ayatullah seems to be, he would not dare to touch the Soviet embassy. The point is that the Soviets are in a position, and of a disposition, not to take such events lying down. The fact of the matter is, as Mr. Nixon used to say, if we want to be a pitiful, helpless giant, we're well on the way to seeming to be one."

As for Carter, he knew that the attack in Iran would inevitably worsen his "leadership" problem and make his quest for a second term more difficult. The circumstances required a restrained response and infinite patience; yet this very stance would reinforce the public's perception of the President as a poor leader. Carter must have recognized the potential damage to his candidacy, but concluded that he had little choice but to act as he did.

As frustration about the plight of the hostages increased, there was a sense that the Administration should do something —anything—to free them. The White House, for sound tactical and strategic reasons, rejected the military options (see box). There were demands for the mass deportation of the 50,000 Iranian students in the U.S.—or at least those who had taken advantage of their visas to picket and demonstrate against the U.S. That was also rejected, since it would blatantly violate U.S. immigration laws.