Blackmailing the U.S.

(10 of 10)

He called for the meeting of the U.N. Security Council, at which members adopted a resolution expressing concern over the detention of the American diplomats, and he asked several of Iran's Muslim neighbors, including Pakistan, for help. Fresh offers of assistance poured in. The Shah passed the word that he was willing to leave the U.S., leading Egyptian President Anwar Sadat —who had denounced the seizure of the hostages as "a disgrace to Islam"—to offer to send his private jet to fly the ailing monarch to Cairo. Retired Heavyweight Champion Muhammad Ali announced he would be willing to exchange himself for the prisoners. Said Ali: "I'm a Muslim, and I am known and loved in Iran." Intrigued, State Department officials suggested that Ali try out his offer on the Iranian embassy in Washington. Pope John Paul II dispatched a personal envoy, Pro-Nuncio Annibale Bugnini, to Qum to meet with Khomeini, but the Ayatullah said he could do nothing unless the U.S. extradited the Shah.

Uncertainty and lack of knowledge contributed to the tension. Carter met with relatives of the hostages, tried to reassure them and discussed some of the problems the U.S. was facing. As Scoop Jackson described the dilemma: "Who do you talk to? Who do you deal with? It's a situation of great instability. You don't know what's going to happen from one moment to the next." One White House aide expressed his anxiety in the jargon of the Pentagon's war gamers: "It's a classic case of gaming versus an irrational opponent. As the irrationality approaches 100%, your ability to game nears zero."

Still, by week's end the Administration was feeling a bit more hopeful about the situation. Having avoided any sort of response that might have worked to the disadvantage of the hostages, the U.S. was increasingly counting on growing pressure from the international community and from Iran's own middle class to exert some influence on the religious leaders and the students. One goal of the American diplomatic strategy was to isolate Iran and make it appear as an irrational outlaw in world opinion. Iranian diplomats privately expressed their sense of embarrassment about the embassy seizure to their Arab colleagues, who in turn passed the message on to Washington. But the big question remained: would such pressures have any real impact on the enigmatic Khomeini—the only man who can order the students to release the hostages?

The state of future relations between Iran and the U.S. will depend on 1) the speed and manner in which the hostages are released and 2) the degree to which Washington can convince the volatile Iranians that it is not befriending the Shah and has no wish to restore him to power.

If all goes well, relations could resume after a cooling-off period of a few months.

However the embassy affair ends, it is a sharp reminder of the degree to which the traditional rules of international conduct can no longer be taken for granted.

The world is changing; the unpredictable is becoming the commonplace.