(9 of 10)
To a great extent, Egypt's Sadat has made diplomatic profit out of an Israeli attitude that appears unreasonable. The Israelis seem to believe that they can have both peace and substantial changes in the pre-1967 map. Yet this may well prove a delusion. White House National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger once noted that absolute security for one power means absolute insecurity for its neighbors. Thus even if Israel were to get the geographically secure boundaries on which it insists, it might merely succeed in increasing instability.
It is not difficult to understand why a people who have had to struggle for sheer survival throughout their existence should be loath to take even the most minimal risks with their security. During his Jordan-sponsored tour of the Golan Heights, Rogers turned to his lieutenant, Joe Sisco, and remarked that it was easy to see how the Israelis could be so concerned about security in such terrain. But Rogers also took pains to note that he could understand, too, how the Arabs felt when looking at land that once was theirs.
Drowning Men
That is the very heart of the problem. Israeli-born Journalist Amos Elon, in his just-published book, The Israelis: Founders and Sons, writes that repeated pogroms in Europe, climaxed by the Nazi holocaust, "imbued the Zionist settlers with the relentless drive of drowning men who force their way on to a life raft large enough to hold both them and those who were already on it." Yet the life raft did not prove quite roomy enough. "By a brutal twist of fate, unexpected, undesired, unconsidered by the early pioneers," adds Elon, the price of establishing a Jewish homeland "was partly paid by the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. The Arabs bore no responsibility for the centuries-long suffering of Jews in Europe; yet in the end, the Arabs were punished because of it. Whatever [the Arabs'] subsequent follies and outrages might be, [their] punishment for the sins of Europe must burden the conscience of Israelis for a long time to come."
Such feelings have affected not only Israelis, but also their sympathizers else where. This, in turn, has made it considerably easier for Sadat to make headway with his diplomatic initiatives. But what is the real goal of those initiatives? Genuine peace — or merely the restoration of Egyptian territory and later on, an attempt to destroy Israel?
The Israelis themselves are extremely uncertain, and accordingly uneasy about the answers to those riddles. In Washington, a U.S. official wonders whether Sa dat is not being more shrewd than moderate. Recalling Sadat's youthful reputation as a firebrand, the official mused: "You can't shed all your ideas, beliefs, and habits of thinking overnight." British Arabist Desmond Stewart, author of the recently published, The Middle East: Temple of Janus, says, "Where Nasser was a pacifist who spoke in bellicose terms, Sadat is a bellicose man who talks in pacific terms." Sadat's performance up to now as President, however, has persuaded even some Israelis to give him the benefit of the doubt. Said Defense Minister Moshe Dayan last month: "Sadat has spoken with sincerity and without guile."