(8 of 10)
As far as Sadat is concerned, this formidable line allows him to negotiate with Israel on an even basis, but does not put him in bondage to Moscow. "To the extent that the Soviets are nervous about his dialogue with the U.S.," said an American official last week, "he is telling them to go to hell, that he is running his own government. But he has put himself out on a limb by expressing faith in American advice that the only way to recover the lost territories is to negotiate. If that doesn't work, his enemies will hold him to his words."
Sadat is not the only one out on a limb. It is possible that the middleman in the current diplomatic exercise—the U.S.—and the two antagonists could all emerge feeling ill-used. The U.S. appears increasingly convinced that the Israelis have grown too rigid, as indeed they have. The Israelis feel that the Americans, particularly Rogers and his State Department, are so anxious to restore U.S. influence in the Arab world that they are willing to impose unacceptable risks on Israel. Golda Meir's government maintains that its policy of tenacity will compel the Arabs to come around eventually if only the U.S. and other major powers would quit meddling. "For God's sake," pleads a top Israeli diplomat, "let us bargain with the Egyptians. Don't force us into things."
The Egyptians, meanwhile, believe that unless the U.S. forces certain terms upon the Israelis, nobody will. They argue that Washington could accomplish this simply by cutting off its arms aid to the Israelis. "The power to give," says one Egyptian official, "is the power to withhold." The U.S. has sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to persuade Cairo that its influence over Israel falls far short of outright control. Moreover, Washington fears that to cut off Israel's last external source of weaponry would only reduce Egypt's incentive to negotiate seriously with Israel, directly or otherwise. There is also the internal U.S. situation to consider; last year no fewer than 81 of the 100 members of the Senate demanded that Washington ship the Israelis all of the Phantom jets they had requested.
On the homeward leg of Rogers' hectic tour, TIME Correspondent, Herman Nickel, who accompanied the Secretary of State, concluded that the trip had accomplished much. U.S. spokesmen felt that they had persuaded both sides that it was essential to keep talking peace to achieve peace. Cabled Nickel: "Rogers succeeded in putting official U.S.-Israeli relations on a more businesslike, less sentimental and chummy basis. This required considerable firmness. Certainly Rogers had his priorities right. Given the solid state of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the tender young reed of a new American relationship with the Arabs, Arab sensibilities were more important than Israeli sensibilities."
Absolute Insecurity