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After the humiliation of the Six-Day War of 1967, Nasser mixed bluster and bullets in his efforts to regain Sinai and the Gaza Strip from Israel. He succeeded only in accumulating 20,000 casualties in his fruitless "war of attrition," and was more than glad to negotiate a ceasefire. Sadat, with a calm and moderate approach and the subtlety of a bazaar merchant, has managed in four months to put Israel on the diplomatic defensive. First, in a major shift in Arab policy, he announced his willingness to recognize Israel's right to exist in return for the restoration of captured territory. Next, he offered a kind of mini-peace on the issue of the Suez Canal as a way of getting that waterway into operation again and, more important, of getting Israeli troops off its east bank.
Sadat's proposals were well timed. In New York, the Big Four meetings on the Middle East involving the U.S., Soviet Union, France, and Britain, were getting nowhere. The indirect talks among Egypt, Jordan and Israel under the aegis of Swedish Diplomat Gunnar Jarring were similarly stalemated. Sadat's proposal seemed a way out of the impasse. Though the Israelis publicly voiced reservations, one high official described the plan as "the only remaining exit." Secretary of State Rogers, who apparently felt the same way about it, scheduled a seven-day Middle Eastern tour to explore the possibility of carrying out the Sadat plan.
Accompanied by nine official delegation members, an administrative and security staff of 36, and 20 Washington newsmen, Rogers visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, winding up at the end of last week in Israel. There were certain dangers implicit in the tour. Simply by winging about the area in a great blue and white presidential 707, Rogers raised hopes that he would break the diplomatic logjam. If there is no progress—either on the Suez plan or the broader issue of an overall Arab-Israeli settlement—the U.S. can expect some harsh criticism. Rogers only fueled that feeling when he said last week: "There has never been, and may not again be for a long time to come, a better opportunity than exists today to move toward a just and lasting peace." Said Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, traveling with Rogers: "One thing is sure. The situation will not stand still. It will either improve or deteriorate."
Two Plans
Sadat's Suez plan calls for the Israelis to withdraw from their fortified Bar-Lev Line to new positions farther back in the desert along a line from just east of the Mediterranean coastal town of El Arish to Ras Mohammed, at the extreme southern tip of the Sinai peninsula just west of Sharm el Sheikh (see map). Once the withdrawal had been accomplished, Egyptians would occupy the area and begin the laborious business of clearing the waterway (see box, page 28).