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Whatever overtures Mubarak makes toward the other Arab governments will presumably be tentative ones, at least until April. Most observers think he will avoid a military showdown with Libya, especially if he feels uncertain about his own army. But he is known to be worried about Libya's recent air strikes inside the Sudanese border. In fact, two days before Sadat's death, Mubarak was in Washington asking for faster delivery of American arms to the Sudan.
In his dealings with the other Arabs, Mubarak may have one advantage over his mentor: he is in a better position to bring about a reconciliation with some of Egypt's traditional friends, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Says Nadav Safran of Harvard University: "The Riyadh-Cairo axis is a natural one, but it was disrupted by Sadat's signing of the peace treaty and the dilemma in which the Saudis found themselves. If they supported Sadat, they exposed themselves to immediate danger from the P.L.O., Iraq, Syria and others; if not, they would lose Egypt. They chose the latter, expecting it to be a temporary alienation. But Sadat personalized his quarrel with Saudi Arabia, and it became a matter of personal pride." Sadat's death, reasons Safran, "will bring about a natural rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and that is important for the U.S. and for the region."
Almost unheard and unnoticed during the early part of the week was the Soviet Union, which issued a condolence message of studied correctness. Later in the week, Soviet papers declared that the assassination revealed the depth of opposition to Sadat's policies and accused the U.S. of using his death to "frighten the Arabs." But except for those outbursts in the press, the Soviets remained quiet. They will certainly try to work their way back into Egypt, where they have been so long deprived of a significant role. But for the moment they can sit back and reap the rewards of Arab frustration over the West Bank, the Israeli settlements, the AWACS debate and everything else that is not going right for the U.S.
The Reagan Administration does not enjoy the same luxury. It has lost its best friend in the Middle East, a man on whom four U.S. Presidents have relied, have admired for his sometimes reckless courage and have forgiven for his errors. Because he was so bold, Sadat's trip to Jerusalem and the peace process that followed became a broad channel for breaking out of the impasse of the preceding three decades. Sadat trusted his friends; he expected them to understand that he was not making a separate peace, and in the end he was not well served by U.S. Administrations that failed to press the Israelis toward a wider settlement. "I attribute a certain amount of blame to the U.S. for what happened to Sadat," says Hermann Eilts, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt. For almost two years, says Eilts, Washington has followed a "policy of almost total inaction on the broader Middle East peace treaty. This made people like Sadat very vulnerable. He counted on the U.S. to move the peace process forward."