(5 of 10)
A more widely held view, especially among some Western observers, was that the attack was part of a larger plot aimed at deposing the Sadat regime and installing an uncompromisingly Arab nationalist, anti-Israeli government. It is argued that a chain of command existed that reached from the assailants through some radical field officers, perhaps even a brigadier, to one of Egypt's most famous political exiles, Lieut. General Saadeddin Shazli, 59. Shazli, who was the Egyptian army's chief of staff and one of the heroes of the 1973 war, was later relieved of his command by Sadat, who blamed him for allowing the Israelis to break through the Egyptian lines and cross to the west bank of the Suez Canal. Four years later, after Sadat's journey to Jerusalem, Shazli quit as ambassador to Portugal. He remained in exile and formed an anti-Sadat group, the Egyptian National Front, based in Damascus. After Sadat's murder, Shazli declared in Algeria, where he now lives: "Sadat was doomed from the day he went to Jerusalem. Anyone who follows in that traitorous path will similarly be doomed."
There was no direct evidence that either the Soviet Union or Libya was involved, though it is possible that some Libyan money found its way into the hands of the plotters. Israeli intelligence officials had indicated for some time that they were worried about penetration of the Egyptian army and intelligence community by anti-Sadat elements, reputedly backed by the Libyans and the Soviets.
In fact, Israel's intelligence chief flew to Cairo last month to discuss the matter with Egyptian officials. The Israelis also suspected that anti-Sadat elements were planning a major operation, but they did not know its precise nature.
Assuming he can hold dissident forces in check, Mubarak's first task will be to address himself to the problems of ruling Egypt. No doubt he will attempt immediately to confirm the loyalty of the army. He is likely to promote some officers, retire a few, perhaps announce a pay hike for all ranks. He will promise to uphold Egypt's 1971 constitution and its vision of democracy; Egypt is certainly not yet such a state, but under Sadat, autocratic as he was, it became more democratic than it had ever been before. To satisfy the fellahin—the peasants—and particularly the Islamic fundamentalists, he will try to find ways to ease the problems of the country's poor. He may also attempt to conceal some of the more blatant signs of Westernization that have offended orthodox Muslims, particularly the open displays of ostentatious spending by the very rich.
There is a sense throughout Egypt that the economic promise held out by the peace treaty with Israel has never been realized. Thus far, advantages and liabilities have canceled each other out.