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And what does the act mean for the stability of Egypt? As in a mystery novel in which hardly a character is free of suspicion, Sadat had so many enemies that almost no political or religious group can be completely ruled out. He was despised as a traitor by Arab nationalist radicals at home as well as those in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and elsewhere. He was hated by Islamic fundamentalists both inside and outside Egypt, and their numbers, like their fervor, are on the increase. He was at odds with some of his country's Coptic Christians. He had quarreled with the Soviet Union for nine years and only last month expelled the Soviet ambassador. At that time he also ordered the arrest of 1,600 Egyptian dissidents of all kinds, including several old comrades. Lately, in the view of some observers, he had seemed more harried, more desperate than the visible circumstances warranted. Had he learned of a plot in the making?
The official Egyptian position last week was that the assassination had been the work of a small band of Muslim fanatics acting alone, with no links to any political organizations or foreign country. According to the government, the group had been composed of four men, all from the same area of Upper Egypt: First Lieut. Khaled Ahmed Shawki el-Istambuli, who commanded an artillery battery, and two former lieutenants and a reserve officer. As a legitimate participant in the parade, Khaled had ordered other troopers off their truck and substituted the assassins. According to Defense Minister Abdel Halim Abu Gha-zala, the four had purchased on the black market the grenades and guns they used in the attack. "It was very primitive, but successful," said Abu Ghazala. "At this point we do not believe they are part of a larger group."
Some skepticism greeted the official explanation. It is true that there were no sure signs of parallel attacks anywhere else, or any coordinated efforts to take over the country, as presumably would have been the case in a wider conspiracy. But some questions remained. Sadat's security men seemed slow to react, though the spectacular nature of the attack might well have stunned them. More important, the professional nature of the assault suggested the possibility of thorough training and a larger operation. Somehow the assassins evaded the security check prior to the parade. They were able to sneak live ammunition and grenades aboard their open truck. They positioned their vehicle in the column closest to the reviewing stand. Finally, they were able to reach the stand at the precise moment when the eyes of the President, his security detail and everyone else were focused on the jets overhead. Was the split-second timing an eerie coincidence, or had the attackers known the precise schedule of the parade?
A small, violent Muslim fundamentalist sect known as Takfir wa Hijra (Atonement and Holy Flight) may have been involved. This group, a band of urban guerrillas seeking to transform Egypt into a rigid Islamic state, exhorts its members to use "sacred terror" to achieve its objectives and is known to have built cell groups within the armed forces.