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Nonsense, said Perle. The flight time of the Pershing, he explained, is not, as the Soviets claim, six minutes, but somewhere between twelve and 15 minutes, or about the same as that of the SS-20. Moreover, said Perle, it would be suicidal to use the Pershing II as a first-strike weapon. The NATO plan includes only 108 Pershing Us. To attack hardened targets, nuclear strategists assume two missiles per target, which would mean 54 targets for the Pershing Us—too insignificant, in superpower terms, to matter. By contrast, the 1,053 SS-20 warheads can strike virtually all high-value targets in NATO Europe. Retired Admiral Bobby Inman, the former deputy director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, also brushed aside the Soviet Union's complaints. "You would have some days of preparation and at least hours of readiness for full use of nuclear weapons," he said.
Perle countered the charge that the U.S. was exaggerating Soviet military superiority. Said he: "By whatever measure, the trend of the past dozen years is clear-it has flip-flopped in favor of the Soviet Union. The U.S. fell behind in all categories with the sole exception of the number of warheads, and if we meet again next year under these circumstances, it will be true in respect to the number of warheads as well." Perle then summed up his strategic credo. "I do believe deterrence works," he said. "Inhibiting the Soviet Union is the alliance's first priority. If we are going to err, I suppose we should err on the side of having more than may turn out to be necessary. The consequences of having a little bit too little are very severe indeed."
When the knotty question of alliance cooperation outside the NATO area was raised by U.S. Under Secretary of Defense Fred Ikle, polemics flared. Iklé began by noting amicably that French and Italian participation in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon was a gratifying example of a nascent if limited new role for NATO. But in Central America, which Iklé considered the other powder keg in the world, the European allies had not only failed to support U.S. policy but at times actively undermined it. When Iklé said that the problem was a lack of understanding about the importance of the area, Healey snapped, "We think it is very important and believe you are about to make an appalling mistake there."
Joining the fray, Pierre Hassner, of France's National Foundation of Political Science, added, "I cannot help a feeling of déjà vu when you [Americans] talk about the dangers of leaving the region. It is what we said about Algeria and what you said about Viet Nam. You always fail to appreciate the basic problem, which is domestic change. You are in a no-win situation. It would be better to cut your losses and obtain, as you did in Cuba, a guarantee that there will be no Soviet bases there to be used against you. But you cannot prevent domestic political evolution."