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Beyond that, said Henderson, the U.S. must explain to the world "whether it is seeking superiority over the Soviets or whether it is prepared to have balance"—a point that goes to the heart of the split between Washington and Western Europe. For the Reagan Administration and some U.S. strategists like Sonnenfeldt, the balance already has tilted "dangerously against the West." Many Europeans, and many conference participants, remain unconvinced. Said Sonnenfeldt: "This tilt [hi the military balance] does not only concern the defense of Europe but also the defense of common European and American interests in such areas as the Persian Gulf. It is most unfortunate that this discussion gets carried out in terms of superiority and inferiority. It ought to be carried out in terms of whether we have the military capability to do what we have to do in case of need."
It is in the fundamental difference between U.S. and European perceptions of the Soviet threat that the alliance must bridge its deepest split. Several military experts at the conference noted that the Soviets are already deploying a new generation of shorter-range mobile missiles, which could be used for European warfare. Their psychological impact on Western Europe could be almost as great as that of the SS-20s today. It is not too early for NATO to prepare for the shock of that fresh crisis. The alliance can hardly do so if it cannot develop a stronger consensus today on how to go about its fundamental purpose—dealing with Soviet power in Europe.
—By Frederick Painton.
Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof and Jordan Bonfante/Hamburg