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Defense Concerns. To a surprising degree, a large and otherwise diverse majority closed ranks behind three propositions: that there is rough overall global equivalence between the superpowers; that there is a regional imbalance in Europe favoring the Soviet Union; and that regionally and globally there are ominous trends in Soviet wherewithal and behavior. But there were also complaints that the U.S. is overrating the Soviet threat and that Washington's rhetoric is reckless, to the point where the U.S. appears unconvincing in its commitment to negotiate in Geneva. In addition, Europeans were almost unanimous in reprimanding the U.S. for conducting a "cold war" crusade in Central America and then complaining when distant NATO allies failed to support it.
Although there was general agreement on the need to deploy the new NATO missiles on schedule, Karsten Voigt, West German Social Democratic Party spokesman for foreign and security affairs, suggested the possibility of postponement, even without a deal with the Soviets in Geneva. Voigt called the deterrent value of the Pershing II "greatly exaggerated" and said its mission could soon be taken over by conventional weapons. Joining in the challenge, Healey questioned the overall U.S. assessment of superpower balance. The U.S., Healey claimed, was well ahead in the number of warheads, and in any case, he noted, "I doubt that the disparity is such that it would tempt either side to start a war." Moreover, Healey said, the U.S. armaments program, especially the cruise missile, was bound to provoke the Soviets into matching the Americans, thus actually quickening the arms race. Like Voigt, he urged less reliance on nuclear weapons and an upgrading of conventional forces, an effort Perle described as "a costly proposition."
Perle, one of the Reagan Administration's principal strategic planners, took on the critics stoutly. Was the Pershing II's deterrent value overrated? No, he explained. There was no great fondness for its military capability; it was appreciated for its political value as a testimony to NATO's credibility. Said Perle: "The Pershing II is a keystone in the overall deployment plan. I think the Soviets have understood, as we have, that if you remove the keystone, the arch will crumble."
Both Perle and the State Department's Burt stated flatly that the U.S. at Geneva will reject any proposal that envisions abandoning the Pershing II. The missile has been the principal target of a massive Soviet propaganda campaign, which charges that the Pershing II, with a six-minute flight time from West Germany to its Soviet target, would give the West a first-strike nuclear capability.