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C. The U.S. would begin deploying MXs starting in 1986. It would be prepared to postpone deployment if, before 1986, the Soviet Union agreed to a schedule by which its SS-18s would be destroyed over a three-year period starting in 1986.
D. Both sides would also agree to dismantle the remaining land-based MIRV forces starting in 1990.
E. In that case, both sides would agree not to increase the number of warheads on MIRVs while they remain in the force.
F. Other mixes are possible. For example, a small number of MIRVed missiles and bombers, no more than 200, could be joined with a reduced single-warhead deployment, say 300.
This approach would be a serious test of Soviet intentions. It would conclusively end the danger of a first strike. It would establish clear equivalence. It would transcend the SALT and START debate and put strategy and arms control in a coherent context. If refused, it would be a clear signal of a Soviet bid for superiority; we would draw the appropriate conclusions. If we proceeded unilaterally, nevertheless, it would be a major contribution to strategic stability and U.S. security.
Of course, even the achievement of strategic stability would open up areas of concern now dormant. It would bring to the fore the pressing need to build up conventional forces to deter non-nuclear challenges. That problem would be addressed in a new environment. For all parties would know that they have taken—at last—a big step toward avoiding nuclear catastrophe. This is an imperative that humanity demands and reality imposes. -