(7 of 8)
Where does this leave the MX? A presidential commission is studying that question. I will address one issue: Should we have a "counterforce" capability (an ability to strike accurately at Soviet missile silos or command centers), or should we continue to aim for "assured destruction" of civilian and industrial targets? Ever since the Soviets began to approach strategic parity, it should have been obvious that a strategy aiming at civilian destruction was an irrational, suicidal, indeed nihilistic course that no President could implement. Undiscriminating slaughter is not a defense policy but a prelude to unilateral disarmament.
Similarly, why should a Soviet counterforce capability—as now exists—be treated as consistent with strategic stability, while our attempt, represented by the MX, to provide a much smaller means to respond is considered as somehow destabilizing? If the U.S., by its abdication, guarantees the invulnerability of Soviet missile forces while the Soviets keep ours exposed, any Soviet incentive for serious negotiation will vanish. A secure Soviet first-strike capability poses an unprecedented danger—ultimately that it may some day be used, in the near term that it may increase Soviet willingness to run risks in regional crises.
Whatever level of MX deployment is recommended by the Scowcroft Commission should be strategically meaningful beyond a mere token deployment. At the same time, the MX, like the new single-warhead missile, should be an organic part of an arms-control strategy. To this end, we should offer to postpone MX deployment if the Soviets agree to destroy MIRVed null (their heavy missiles) over three years starting in 1986, and to abandon MX altogether once the SS-18s are dismantled.
This analysis has been confined to land-based missiles. Were the Soviets to show interest in the scheme outlined here, account would have to be taken of sea-based forces. Just as we cannot be asked to ratify our own vulnerability in land-based forces, the Soviets should not be expected to acquiesce in U.S. submarine-launched missiles capable of surprise attack. Specifically, as part of the agreement proposed here, we should be prepared to move to single warheads at sea as well, though over a longer period, say 15 years, because of the long lead times. In that case, the submarines would have to be made smaller and less expensive. It would be too risky to put so many eggs in one basket, as is the case with the current Trident submarines, each of which carries 24 missiles. A new regimen would be required as well for heavy bombers.
The deployment-arms control scheme would then look as follows:
A. The U.S. would make a fundamental decision to shift to single-warhead missiles as soon as possible. Ideally, this decision would be reflected in an agreed ceiling at a very low number—perhaps 500—negotiated with the Soviets. An agreement should also limit throw weight to prevent development of huge single-warhead weapons.
B. If the Soviets refused such a scheme, we would proceed unilaterally toward our goal. The final size of a single-warhead force would depend on the number of warheads in the Soviet force and on what we need to assure our invulnerability.