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This course does not depend on Soviet agreement. It should be pursued whatever the Soviet reaction. If they refused our proposal—this one or another embodying the same concept—the U.S. could announce that after a certain date, say 1990 (or before then if the new missile could be developed earlier), it would deploy no more MIRVed land-based intercontinental missiles but would emphasize single-warhead launchers, the majority mobile. The size of that force would be geared to the number of warheads deployed by the Soviets; we would reserve the right to match each Soviet warhead with single-warhead missiles of our own. In practice, we would almost certainly choose a lower number that we calculate could survive the maximum Soviet attack capable of being launched. The purpose would be to increase the number of targets the Soviets would have to hit but without increasing our capacity for surprise attack. We would gradually phase out our MIRVed missiles. If the Soviets agreed to a formal proposal, schedules for the mutual destruction of MIRVs would be negotiated. If they refused, we would build up single-warhead missiles to a level consonant with our security. The Soviets could always put a ceiling on our deployment by cutting the number of their warheads.
This scheme should pose no insurmountable verification problems. Fixed launchers can be detected through national technical means; existing Soviet MIRVed iCBMs could not be made mobile; development of a new mobile MIRVed ICBM would require extensive testing, which could be detected and would therefore be proscribed. Mobile single-warhead missiles would be more difficult to detect; this is why agreed numbers would have to be sufficient so that they could be exceeded only by a violation our means of detection would not miss. Obviously, the more airtight the inspection, the smaller can be the numbers. Only missiles tested solely with single warheads would be permitted; any tested with a MIRV warhead would be proscribed.
No one can predict how the rigid Soviet bureaucracy would react to this approach. It may upset too many vested interests. The new leadership may be too dependent on military support to challenge its military-industrial complex. Yet sometimes an impasse can be broken only by a daring departure; surely the nitpicking SALT negotiations offer little hope for the traditional approach. If the Soviets can ever be interested in stability and in easing the economic burden of the arms race, they should—probably only on second thought—study this scheme with care. Like the Eureka approach, it requires them to redesign their forces; unlike the Eureka approach, it reduces their vulnerability. And upon reflection, the Soviets must realize that, one way or another, we will cure the vulnerability of our forces and in the process will almost surely enhance the vulnerability of theirs.
If the Soviets refuse to discuss such a proposal, one of three conclusions is inescapable: a) their arms program aims for strategic superiority if not by design then by momentum; b) they believe strategic edges can be translated into political advantages; c) arms control to the Soviets is an aspect of political warfare whose aim is not reciprocal stability but unilateral advantage.