(6 of 7)
Indeed, even as the Kissinger talks went on, rearming was under way simultaneously on either side. Both Syria and Israel are now stronger than they were before the October war, and Egypt is not far behind (see chart page 14). Ominously, both sides are armed with surface-to-surface missiles — the Soviet Scud, the U.S. Lance and the Israeli Gabriel — that have ranges of up to 200 miles and could extend future hostilities into civilian areas. Israel has already let it be known that in the event of another war, Arab nations supporting Egypt, Syria or Jordan may also come under attack.
Neither side really wants war. Sadat, for example, faces staggering domestic problems. Egypt's economy faces a trade deficit of $2.3 billion this year, and $1 billion in short-term debts are about to come due. As long as the Suez Canal remains closed, it costs Egypt about $350 million a year in potential revenue. About 40% of Israel's G.N.P. goes for defense, and taxes have been raised to record highs. Beyond that, the loss of 2,552 Israeli soldiers during the October war is still felt keenly in a nation where veterans of three earlier conflicts found themselves fighting again in 1973 with their sons as comrades in arms.
Nonetheless, military forces in Egypt and Syria went on alert as the Kissinger negotiations faltered; Israel called up some reserves even in the midst of last week's Passover observance. Syria is importing extra supplies of wheat, barley, rice and frozen meat, as it did shortly before the October war.
Writing in the current Foreign Affairs quarterly, Harvard Professor of Government Stanley Hoffman suggests one alternative to war. He wrote before the collapse of the shuttle, but he took that possibility into account. "It is time," Hoffman insists, "for a sweeping Israeli initiative aimed at a peace settlement. Instead of what is essentially an American policy groping to bring gradual peace to the parties, we now need a decisive effort by the party whose future existence and security are at stake, whose role in the Middle East has been the heart of the matter since 1948, and which finds itself on the defensive.
"Rather than letting concessions be squeezed out of them by the gentle coaxing and the subtle threats of Mr. Kissinger," Hoffman argues, "the Israelis should — even if this does not lead anywhere at once — seize the initiative toward neighbors who will remain their neighbors just as France remains the neighbor of Germany, and with whom permanent war is hopeless," He adds: "What is required is a willingness on the part of Israel, in exchange for its recognition and the signature of a peace treaty, to accept categorically and in specific terms its withdrawal from occupied territories." The Israelis would also be expected to grant Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip the right to self-determination.
The argument makes sense, of course. The problem at the moment, as former Harvard Professor Kissinger could surely tell his onetime colleague, is to find an Israeli government that is strong enough and bold enough to attempt so daring a gesture.