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At this point, however, Geneva is likely to become little more than a platform for exchanging antagonistic propaganda, aimed primarily at the audiences back home. Kissinger has told the Israelis all along that by interposing himself and the U.S. in negotiations and trying to solve one problem at a time, he was shielding Israel from the tremendous pressure that all the Arabs plus the Soviets would bring to bear at Geneva. There Israel will have to negotiate not only the Sinai but also the Golan Heights and possibly the Palestinian question as well, more or less simultaneously. Sadat's strategy at Geneva will probably aim at isolating Israel from the world even further, in much the manner that Rhodesia and South Africa have been made diplomatic pariahs. Egypt will argue that since Israel refuses to return captured Arab lands, it stands in open defiance of United Nations resolutions 242 and 338 on the Middle East.*
There may also be a broader danger for Israel at Geneva. King Faisal's sudden death last week was an unexpected short-term blessing for Sadat, in a way: the Islamic world was so concerned with mourning the King that there was little criticism of Egypt from less moderate Arab leaders who opposed the Kissinger talks all along. Sadat, nevertheless, stressed Egypt's support of Arab unity by conferring in Riyadh with Palestine Liberation Organization Leader Yasser Arafat after King Faisal's funeral. At Geneva, Egypt and Syria are expected to carry out the will of the Arab summit at Rabat last October by jointly demanding that the P.L.O. be seated instead of Jordan. The Soviets will automatically go along with such a resolution, but Washington cannot. Kissinger's stated position has long been that the U.S. will not talk to Arafat or the P.L.O. until the Palestinian guerrilla groups end terrorist acts and demonstrate responsibility. That attitude is likely to weaken U.S. relations with moderate Arabs at Geneva, and will generate added recriminations against Israel for getting Washington into such a fix.
Unproductive as Geneva promises to be, however, the alternative — renewed war — is obviously much worse. There is a clear and present danger that some incident could trigger a war even before the talks begin. During the negotiations, in deference to the Kissinger shuttle, Israel did not retaliate against the Palestinian attack on Tel Aviv's Savoy Hotel last month (TIME, March 17) in which eleven Israelis were killed. A major raid on fedayeen hideouts in southern Lebanon could lead to larger trouble, especially now that the P.L.O. and the Syrians have agreed to form a unified military command. Many experts worry about what might happen if the two U.N. forces were pulled out of the Sinai buffer zone or from the Golan Heights. "If that happens," a Western military observer in Beirut predicted last week, "there will be a bump — and I don't see how it could be localized. There's too much hardware around on both sides and too much emotion. Events will simply take over."