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As a result of the talks' collapse, Rabin became something of an instant hero, largely because, as a political columnist for the newspaper Yediot Aharanot explained it, "he has proved he is not America's man." The Knesset overwhelmingly approved a resolution upholding the Premier's actions; even the conservative, antigovernment Likud bloc joined in. A post-deadlock poll by Israel's Institute of Applied Social Research showed that 91% of Israelis supported their Premier (although 58% also expressed hope that the government would work toward a negotiated settlement).
The poll results assuaged Israel perhaps, but they did nothing for Washington. President Ford was annoyed with Jerusalem because he felt that the Israelis, out of their own sense of self-interest, should have done more to encourage the peace initiative of the U.S. It is, after all, the Jewish state's principal military supplier and almost only trustworthy ally. In an effort to keep negotiations going and put the Israelis on notice about the consequences they faced if the talks broke down, Ford dashed off a message to Rabin. "I am disappointed to learn," he cabled, "that Israel has not moved as far as it might." The President warned that the U.S. intended to reassess its position in the Middle East, "including our policy towards Israel" — a bald reference to Israel's expected $2.5 billion request for military aid in fiscal 1976. It was the sharpest rebuke to Jerusalem since President Eisenhower in 1956 pressured Israel, France and Britain to end the Suez war.
The Israelis insisted after the talks collapsed that Sadat had been hostile to them all along. The truth is that Sadat is probably the most moderate Arab they are likely to negotiate with for a long time. As Political Analyst Milton Viorst last week noted in the Washington Post, "What Sadat offered Israel was, in a word, his body. Through Kissinger, he was telling Rabin, as he tried to tell Mrs. Meir in late 1973, that he would act as Israel's broker in the Arab world if he could get some visible help from the Israelis. Whatever Israelis may say about him, Sadat clearly considers it more important to get on with Egypt's economic development than to keep on waging futile wars."
Indeed moderation — flavored with firmness — was the keynote of Sadat's special address to Egypt's People's Assembly last weekend. "Some may expect an emotional reaction from me [to the breakdown of the Kissinger efforts] but I prefer action to reaction," declared the Egyptian leader. Thus, despite fears that Cairo would not renew the mandate for the U.N.'s peace-keeping forces in the Sinai, which expires on April 24, Sadat said he would agree to a three-month extension because "I do not want to place a sudden crisis before the international community." Yet, he explained, he would not agree to a six-month extension (the current term of the mandate) because he wants "the whole world to know that there are limits to time as well as to patience."