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What started out as an imminent Jordanian collapse was beginning to reverse itself. Tuesday, Sept. 22, brought good news. The Jordanians, emboldened by our moves and by the fact that the Syrian air force (under a general named Hafez Assad) pointedly stayed out of combat, were beginning to attack Syrian tanks around Irbid from the air. The estimate was that Syria had lost 120 tanks. The Iraqi forces [17,000 of them were still encamped in east Jordan three years after the Six-Day War that had brought them there] remained inactive. Egypt informed us that the Soviets had made a serious effort to get Syria to reconsider its course in Jordan. Israeli forces on the Golan Heights continued to increase. To maintain the pressure, we increased our own readiness further.
In managing the conclusion of any crisis, perhaps the most critical moment occurs when the opponent appears ready to settle; then it is the natural temptation to relax. This is almost always a mistake; the time for conciliation is after the crisis is surmounted and a settlement or modus vivendi has been reached.
Otherwise moderation may abort the hopeful prospects by raising last-minute doubts as to whether the cost of settlement need be paid. Stopping offensive military actions in Korea in 1951 when cease-fire talks started almost surely prolonged the talks; I would make the same argument about the Viet Nam bombing halt in 1968, though I held a different view at the time.
That is why, even though a Syrian withdrawal was probable, I pressed for an augmentation of our forces in the Mediterranean. Sept. 23 would be critical. If the Syrian forces did not withdraw—if, for example, they simply dug in—the point of maximum pressure would pass. Israel would either intervene with the attendant consequences or we would be seen to be bluffing. Then the war might start up again—or else the Syrians would maintain a "liberated zone" in Jordan, mortgaging the King's survival. Four more destroyers were therefore authorized to head for the Mediterranean; two attack submarines were slated to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar. Contingency planning against Soviet intervention continued.
At 2:50 p.m. on Sept. 23, we received conclusive word thai Syrian tanks were withdrawing. The crisis was over.
TILT! THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR
In 1971 Pakistan was disintegrating. The Bengali-dominated East, separated by 1,000 miles of India from the less populous but long-dominant West, was moving toward autonomy, if not outright independence. Civil war loomed. The East's 75 million people had been under martial law since 1969. Now Pakistani President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan's troops, most of them Punjabis from the West who were offended by the East's separatist demands, went on a murderous rampage. Bengali refugees began streaming into India, eventually numbering some 8 million. India's Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, protesting that the refugees were placing an intolerable burden on her country, soon began hinting strongly at a move against Pakistan. In Kissinger's view, the refugee situation was merely