Special Section: CRISIS AND CONFRONTATION

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the King would have been gravely weakened. Instability in Jordan would have been added to insecurity along the Suez Canal; Soviet prestige would have been demonstrated and reinforced. But by getting too greedy—by not helping to rein in their clients—the Soviets gave us the opportunity to restore the equilibrium before the balance of forces had been fundamentally changed.

At the end of the second week in September, the Palestinians had destroyed all four airplanes but had achieved no basic concessions either from the U.S. or from Israel. Our tone had become increasingly firm; we were almost hourly augmenting our military forces in the area. At this point, whether because our readiness measures had given him a psychological lift or because he was reaching the point of desperation, Hussein resolved on an all-out confrontation with the fedayeen.

Late on Sept. 15, Dean Brown, our newly arrived Ambassador to Jordan, sent in an urgent cable from Amman that Hussein had decided to re-establish law-and-order in his capital. After surrounding the city with loyal troops, Hussein on Sept. 17 boldly ordered his army into Amman. Large-scale fighting broke out, spreading also to the north of Jordan around Irbid.

Now that civil war had erupted in Jordan, a rapid deployment of U.S. forces was vital to discourage any temptations. I discussed this at great length with Nixon. He approved all the deployments enthusiastically; they appealed to his romantic streak: "The main thing is there's nothing better than a little confrontation now and then, a little excitement."

Invasion from Syria

In the face of the U.S. military moves, the Soviets seemed to grow nervous. On Sept. 18 they sent a reassuring note. Kissinger was encouraged, but not his boss.

Nixon expressed his doubts; whenever the Soviets volunteered reassurance, he said, something sinister was afoot. He proved to be right.

On the morning of Sunday, Sept. 20, Syrian tanks invaded Jordan. At about 6 a.m. Washington time, both the King and Zaid Rifai, his close adviser, reported to Ambassador Brown two major incursions of Syrian tanks. Hussein requested American assistance, without being specific. At 12:30 p.m. Rifai, on behalf of the King, asked for U.S. reconnaissance to determine whether the Syrians were bringing up additional forces. At about the same time two more Syrian armored brigades crossed into Jordan and attacked on a broad front.

I had no doubt that this challenge had to be met. To make a final recommendation to the President, I called a meeting of the WSAG for 7 p.m. that evening. From then on until the National Security Council meeting the next morning, the crisis for us in Washington took the form of almost uninterrupted meetings and telephone calls.

At about 8:20 p.m., we heard from the British that the King was requesting immediate air strikes. The British message reinforced our predisposition in favor of standing aside for an Israeli move. We did not possess enough intelligence or target information to respond rapidly with American forces. At the same time, to discourage Soviet intervention, we would have to accelerate our readiness; we would thereby heighten the perception that intervention was threatening.

At 9:27 p.m., I asked Assistant Secretary of State Joe Sisco to join me in conveying our recommendations to the President; as the