DEFENSE: Arming to Disarm in the Age of Detente

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their own MiRVed missiles. The U.S. had thought the Russians were five years away from developing MIRV. Despite the tests, Schlesinger does not expect Russia to finish development of MIRV technology before 1976—and, more important, does not expect the Soviets to match U.S. inventory before the mid-1980s. Still, the tests were a disquieting sign that the relentless Soviet momentum in weapons research is closing the technology gap.

Research Gap. To high-ranking officers like Moorer, U.S. military power "has clearly peaked and is now declining." Arms Control Expert Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute fears that if the purse strings are not loosened, the Soviet Union "will pull ahead both in terms of strategic and conventional forces." Both to maintain the strength necessary to make detente work and to protect itself, the U.S. cannot wait for that to happen before acting. New weapons take five to ten years to reach production. General George S. Brown, head of the Air Force Systems Command, points out that in research, "momentum is the key."

The Soviet Union keeps secret how much it spends on military research and development, and Western estimates of the figure vary widely. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute believes that it averages up to $10 billion a year, while U.S. intelligence analysts say that the current expenditure is more like $16 billion-$20 billion. In comparison, the U.S. in recent years has been spending about $8 billion annually. Pentagon Research Chief Malcolm R. Currie says that the Russians have greatly enlarged the pool of engineers and scientists available to its military effort, though it is not known how many are actually engaged in such research. In 1960 Russia had 225,000 research scientists and engineers, while the U.S. had 400,000. Today Russia has 625,000, and the U.S. 550,000. Schlesinger and other Pentagon planners complain that the Soviets have deployed one new submarine-launched missile and are testing four new land-based missiles. The U.S. is planning a new missile for the Trident submarine but has no new ICBM in the works.

Outside the Pentagon, there is widespread agreement that Russia is indeed striving to surpass the American nuclear arsenal. Declares Foreign Affairs Specialist Zbigniew Brzezinski: "SALT I on the American side was a plateauing in weapons development. Given the secrecy and level of Soviet development, the situation is increasingly less and less stable." Arid in the Kissinger-Schlesinger world view, stability is the key not only to security but diplomacy. But there is disagreement over whether the nuclear statistics have any real meaning. According to M.I.T. Political Scientist George Rathjens, "More hardware at this point is irrelevant [because] modest numbers of thermonuclear weapons will suffice to inflict levels of damage on nations that would be unacceptable under all circumstances."

Numbers of nuclear weapons, however, do have psychological importance to the people and politicians of both countries. Harvard's Doty explains: "To the extent that numbers influence worldwide opinion, then numbers become a realistic basis for argument, even though they do not have much to do with the worldwide arms situation. It is important to distinguish between military reality on the one plane and political perception on the