Republicans: The New Rules of Play

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For George Romney it was the final indignity: never in his lurching pursuit of the presidential nomination had he created the impact wrought in the five minutes he took to end the quest. Seldom, in fact, has any political announcement detonated such shock waves or so rapidly reversed the positions of two men—in this case, Romney and Nelson Rockefeller. But the result for the Republican Party last week was clarification rather than confusion. Now, at last, the G.O.P. can focus on a choice between its two strongest alternatives: New Yorkers Rockefeller and Richard Nixon.

Within hours of Romney's rocketing exit, Nixon and Rockefeller were adjusting to the new rules of play. Nixon, the sole surviving announced candidate of stature, had been cruelly deprived of an easy victim in at least three primaries: New Hampshire, Wisconsin and Nebraska. He had to find someone—or something—to run against and prove his ballot-box muscle. But Nixon's status was clear, his rhetoric free of cloying coyness, his organization smoothly functioning. For Rockefeller, the adjustment was far more complex.

Quasi Candidacy. After a brief but foredoomed effort to linger in noncandidacy, Rockefeller announced: "I am not going to create dissension within the Republican Party by contending for the nomination, but I am ready and willing to serve the American people if called." He then held a press conference in which he attempted to define the limits of what might be termed quasi candidacy. He insisted that he would not enter any primaries because to do so would promote dissension, but said he would not discourage write-in campaigns. He will not build up a "large organization," but "if some group wants to go out and organize, that's part of a draft effort. With me, that's O.K."

On what basis might the party draft him? "I would expect now to speak out on matters of importance to the American people"—including Viet Nam—"at the proper time." As recently as Oct. 17, Rockefeller had declared: "I don't want to be President." Had the old yen returned? "If that is what the party would like and they feel I can do the job, yes." Why this new availability? "I felt I had to make some response to the action taken by Romney. But I am not the type of person who acts instantly. Things evolve with me."

Premature Exposure. It may have been the fastest evolution in political history. Since he won his third term as Governor in 1966, Rockefeller and his closest advisers have believed that any overt move for the G.O.P. presidential nomination would 1) foreclose any hope of his winning it, and 2) seriously damage any other moderate candidate's chance. During a 1966 post-election vacation at Dorado Beach, Puerto Rico, Rockefeller outlined a plan to fuse factions in the national party from the center leftward in a "consensus" that would provide "practical alternatives to the present Administration" in both policies and a candidate. The 25 Republican Governors (now 26) were to be the spearhead of the movement, and Rockefeller soon settled on Romney as its beneficiary. Rockefeller believed himself incapable of filling that function.

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