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Choking Off. The impact of the President's drastic decision on his own re-election prospects will depend, of course, on how it works out. All that was certain is that the war is once again a paramount political issue—and is again dividing the American people. But more important than Richard Nixon's personal fate was the jolting fact that such a potentially fateful and controversial step could be taken by one man in a country that jealously protects itself against arbitrary action across the whole range of Government.
Whether or not Nixon "lucks out," the risks far exceeded the probable results. It is one thing to come vigorously to the support of the South Vietnamese on the battlefield, but quite another to escalate that support into great-power confrontation. In fact, Nixon had really failed to prove the logic of such a drastic step as interdiction and semi-blockade. The great bulk of the American troops in Viet Nam are not in imminent danger. Most are in well-fortified defensive positions near Danang and Saigon —with well-laid plans to group for collective defense and to be airlifted out if the need arises. Only a total and swift ARVN collapse could threaten those troops—and if such a rout were about to occur, the slow choking off of war matériel by mining could hardly have any saving effect.
Speculating on what might happen if the Soviets chose to challenge the interdiction of North Viet Nam, one high U.S. official said at week's end: "We don't want an armed confrontation. But I don't know what we would do." Added another, in typical Administration athletic metaphor:* "There ain't no game plan. We are winging this one."
It was to be hoped that the Administration knew its mind better than that.
* Secretary Laird last week described the South Vietnamese army as "an expansionist ball club." The U.S. mining operation carries the code name