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Grave Threat. Speaking somberly and forcefully, Nixon repeatedly raised the specter of endangered American troops in Viet Nam to justify his decision to mine the ports and bomb the North. The "massive invasion" of South Viet Nam by North Vietnamese troops, he contended, "gravely threatens the lives of 60,000 American troops." Pledged Nixon: "We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor." He claimed that politically it would be "a very easy choice" simply to withdraw all of those troops—"after all I did not send over one-half million Americans to Viet Nam. I have brought 500,000 men home." Precipitate withdrawal, though, would amount to "an American defeat," and such a defeat, he said once more, would "encourage aggression all over the world—aggression in which smaller nations, armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will, in the Mideast, in Europe and other areas." Also, it would mean "turning 17 million South Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny and terror." Since the North Vietnamese have met every U.S. peace offer "with insolence and insult," the only U.S. recourse, he said, was to employ "decisive military action to end the war."
That action, Nixon insisted, was not directed against the Soviet Union. Addressing Moscow, he explained: "We expect you to help your allies, and you cannot expect us to do other than to continue to help our allies. But let us help our allies only for the purpose of their defense—not for the purpose of launching invasions against their neighbors."
Along with his martial talk and his new war measures, Nixon offered a peace package that included several important new concessions. If the Communists will return all Americans now held prisoner and agree to "an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina," he said, the U.S. would agree to stop "all acts of force throughout Indochina." Aides later explained that this meant that the U.S., for the first time, was offering to withdraw all its sea and air forces from the area. Moreover, there was no insistence that the Communists give up any territory they have seized in South Viet Nam. Nixon also said the U.S. would complete its withdrawal within four months of a cease-fire rather than the previously offered six months. This military-only offer would leave the political future of South Viet Nam to be negotiated by the Vietnamese alone if they want it that way. Although he promised continued support to South Viet Nam, he did not mention the name of President Thieu.
Intense Drive. The mining of North Vietnamese ports, he said, was already "being implemented," and the mines would be activated after "three daylight periods." Ignoring the invitation to leave, fewer than a dozen Soviet vessels remained locked inside the minefield at Haiphong. By week's end, no Soviet vessel had tried to maneuver its way through the dangerous waters. Yet about 20 freighters, some of them Russian, were still on course toward Haiphong, as were two Soviet minesweepers. A symbolic "I dare you" challenge of the huge U.S. air and sea armada seemed unlikely, but it was still possible.