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Always, the mining or blockade of North Vietnamese ports remained a possibility. But most of his advisers considered it both too risky and too ineffectual to be given top priority. Past CIA studies had concluded that cargo could be diverted to rail lines, roads or an airlift, at a high cost in manpower, but still effectively enough to blunt a blockade. Moreover, all-out bombing in the past had failed to knock out all rail and road shipments. Even the sea routes might be kept open by enemy use of small vessels to unload freighters in unmined waters.
The most likely Nixon action seemed to be to employ massive airpower in the North. But even the extension of this option to include targets as far north as Hanoi and Haiphong was resisted by two key advisers: Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers. An inviting alternative to all such military measures seemed to be available when Henry Kissinger, the President's ubiquitous National Security Adviser, flew to Moscow in April for secret talks with Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev, ostensibly to discuss plans for the summit. Kissinger returned, convinced that Brezhnev had conveyed more than just a sign that Hanoi was finally ready for fruitful negotiations in Paris.
Nixon's mood changed to cold anger when Kissinger arrived home from further secret talks in Paris with Hanoi Negotiator Le Duc Tho and reported absolutely no progress. Both Kissinger and Nixon felt that they had been deceived by Brezhnev. An aide said that Nixon "had had it with the North Vietnamese." Nixon explained: "I am ready to settle with them; they should know that. But they're not going to push me into the sea."
Nixon also worried about his trip to Moscow. He feared that he could be caught trading toasts in the Kremlin as the Communists took Hue, an event that could demoralize the entire South Vietnamese military and civil structure. "How could he go to Moscow and sit there and die the death of a thousand cuts?" asked one of his aides. "What would be the situation with the battle reports coming in every day from Viet Nam and 60,000 Americans at the mercy of the enemy?"
Lively Discussion. Nixon began to consider more seriously the possibility of mining harbors. While he recognized the grave risk of conflict with Soviet vessels, he thought this course would not push the Russians into a corner. "Passive" minefields, after all, need not be entered unless Moscow deliberately chose to do so. More and more, Nixon withdrew to his Executive Office Building hideaway to ponder the problem.
Two aides became his chief counselors as he approached his decision: Kissinger and, more surprisingly, Treasury Secretary John Connally. Kissinger outlined the military and diplomatic risks involved in the mining. Connally was consulted on the probable impact on domestic politics. He had no doubts at all. "The American people will respond to strong and decisive leadership," the Texas Democrat advised. The continuing decline in the clout of Secretary of State Rogers became clear. He was off on a pre-summit tour of Western capitals while Nixon worked out his mining plans.