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MacArthur could not argue with that. The argument is over who makes the rules for fire fighting. The firemen? Or the arsonists?
To avoid involving MacArthur in further controversy, suppose that the mythical General Legion (who got fired a few paragraphs back) and Captain Harry Truman each applied his strategic principles to the aggressions of the 1930s.
MANCHURIA, 1931. General Legion:
Bring the U.S., British and other navies down on the inferior Japanese navy. Captain Truman: Send U.S. and other troops to Manchuria. Let the Japanese navy alone. Do not attack Japanese supply lines to Manchuria.
ETHIOPIA, 1935. General Legion: Blockade Italy, shutting off oil. Close the Suez Canal to Italian troop ships. If necessary, bombard Genoa, Naples, Leghorn, Palermo. Captain Truman: Send American troops to Ethiopia. No blockade. No closing of the canal.
RHINELAND, 1936. General Legion's solution and Captain Truman's coincide here, because the area of aggression is also the place where the enemy should have been attacked.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1938. General Legion: Tell Hitler to get out of there or else the free world is coming across the Rhine. Captain Truman: Send troops to Czechoslovakia, presumably by parachute, but do not widen the war by crossing the Rhine. Captain Truman's policy might have avoided World War II—in the sense that the Axis would have won the world without having to fight the war.
Provocation v. Calculation
Through the Truman speech and through much American and U.N. thought runs the fear of provoking the Reds. No man can be absolutely certain that some U.S. action (such as the Berlin airlift) will not some day anger the Communists into starting World War III. But the evidence—and there is a great deal of it—all runs the other way.
The Red bosses seem to be cool, calculating men. Opportunity, not provocation, is what moves them. Wherever they have been "provoked," they backed down. Wherever they have been appeased, they grabbed for more. The U.N. may negotiate an appeasement in Korea, but it will be merely the prelude to the next aggression.
The Russians may get into the Korean war, but they will get in when & if they think that the best thing for them to do, not because they are provoked. And no matter what the circumstances when they decide to move, they will claim that they were "intolerably provoked," a Communist phrase meaning "hungry."
Many Britons are among those who think that the danger of war lies in provoking the Communists. British influence was a powerful factor on Truman in both the firing of MacArthur and the speech defending it. Italy's Premier Alcide de Gasperi, when he heard of the firing, called it "the greatest victory of British diplomacy since the war."
In this generation, the predominant British feelings toward Asia are guilt and a sense of failure. The glorious contributions to Asia of British justice and organization are forgotten. Only the seamy side of imperialism is remembered. On many subjects, Truman could profitably use British wisdom and experience. But to take British guidance on Asia is like taking guidance on credit and currency problems from Chiang Kaishek.