(2 of 6)
Then there is the charge that MacArthur meddled in non-military affairs. Many (perhaps most) of the important subjects dealt with by high officers of all armies are partly military and partly political or economic or social or psychological. It is no reflection on George Marshall to say that he is the most successful congressional lobbyist of his time. Reaching agreement with congressmen on the defense objectives and needs of the U.S. was a main part of Marshall's wartime job as Chief of Staff. Such a job cannot be performed without reference to nonmilitary matters.
What MacArthur meddled in was defining the strategic objective and general plan of the Korean war. Up until 10:48 on the night of April 11, when Truman finished his fateful speech, neither objective nor plan had yet been clearly defined. Everybody was in on the debate. G.I.s in Korea were writing: "What the hell are we doing here? How are we going to win this?" Colonels were proclaiming that the long-range strategic situation was "untenable." General Ridgway had said: "I would see no end to the military operations unless there were a political settlement." All the columnists from Walter Lippmann to Walter Winchell were wondering and proposing and punditing over the basic strategy of the Korean war. And Mr. Truman's own Administration was hip-deep in plan after plan after plan, trying to answer the great question: Where do we go from here?
MacArthur Fought the War The Way Truman Wanted
Over the years in Tokyo, MacArthur had formed some conclusions about how to beat the enemy. If he had reached no such conclusions he would not have been fit for his job.
The main issue between Truman and MacArthur is whether the war should be limited to Korea. The record shows that in spite of his opinion, MacArthur, a thorough soldier, fought the war his commander's way, insofar as Truman's views were known. It would have been very easy for MacArthur to let "incidents" happen that would carry the war beyond the borders of Korea. Such incidents have not happened. By strict military discipline, MacArthur has kept flyers from chasing enemy planes beyond the Yalu River. Chinese shipping, bringing supplies to the enemy, has been at the mercy of ships in MacArthur's command. Yet Chinese ships outside of Korean territorial waters have not been sunk.
Although he was fighting the war Truman's way, MacArthur let the public know that he did not like Truman's way This was deliberate on MacArthur's part, and it is the strongest point in the case against him. A subordinate officer has a right and even an obligation to object to any proposed course of action that he considers unreasonable or unwise. He has no such clear right to make his objections public, although in these situations many high officers have done what MacArthur did—and done it more adroitly.
Truman decided that MacArthur's public expression of opinion was hurting the U.S. In that situation, Truman had three courses open to him:
1) Fire MacArthur.
2) Agree with MacArthur.
3) Get a clear policy of his own and order MacArthur to conform to it.