THE drama of MacArthur's removal and homecoming obscures a far more important fact: President Truman has brought his foreign policy into the open.
This policy, new in the sense that it was publicly stated for the first time, denies to the U.S. the efficient use of its power, guarantees to the enemy the initiative he now has, promises that the U.S. will always fight on the enemy's terms. The policy invites the enemy, World Communism, to involve the U.S. in scores of futile little wars or in messy situations like Iran. Up to now, World War III has been prevented by the fact that the U.S. is stronger than Communism. The new policy almost certainly brings World War III closer because it throws away a large part of U.S. strength.
Truman's speech marked the reversal of a trend: until April 11, Washington had been veering toward what might be called "the MacArthur view." Not MacArthur, but the pressure of events, was driving many civilian and military policymakers (including Truman) toward a positive, active, hopeful, constructive policy of how to combat Communist aggression (see "The U.S. Gets a Policy"—TIME, Feb. 26). For weeks, newsmen have been hearing from the mouths of some of Truman's closest advisers that the passive policy of Dean Acheson ("wait until the dust settles" in Asia) was losing out. George Marshall himself was said to be getting very interested in new counter-measures against the Chinese Communists.
But when Truman needed (or thought he needed) a defense for firing MacArthur, he turned to Acheson for a brief. Acheson gave him one, prepared several days before for the purpose of defending Acheson's general viewpoint. Revised for the special situation, this speech was admirably suited to the purpose Truman had in mind—charging MacArthur with trying to extend the war. Apparently, it did not occur to Truman or Acheson that the speech could have another—and far greater —effect: giving Communism worldwide possession of the strategic initiative. The new policy is an attempt to elevate Truman's absence of policy in Korea to the dignity of a principle with worldwide applications.
The public debate swirls around the firing itself. This act, however, is but the symbol of a deep cleavage over American policy.
Did MacArthur Meddle In Nonmilitary Matters?
Truman's friends say that by firing MacArthur he settled a dispute over civilian v. military supremacy. The nation's Founding Fathers were rightly concerned over the danger of such a conflict. As it turned out, this issue has rarely arisen in the U.S. (see NATIONAL AFFAIRS). The most serious instance of military insubordination to governmental authority was General Andrew Jackson's seizure of Florida from the Spaniards. Only a Californian would view this act of Harry Truman's hero as a catastrophe.
In each succeeding generation, the tradition of civilian supremacy has grown stronger. It pervades the whole outlook of men as deeply steeped in American principles as Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower and Omar Bradley.