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The Taliban has many enemies, which gives the U.S. a list of potential friends. Moscow--which supported Massood--hates it for providing aid to Chechen rebels and destabilizing Tajikistan, whose hard-pressed armed forces are assisted by Russian ones. China is worried that Muslim Uighur separatists are being trained in Afghan camps. India is desperate to stop the flow to Kashmir of fighters trained by bin Laden. Iran, a nation of Shi'ite Muslims, detests the Taliban because it consists of Sunni extremists; moreover, Tehran has to deal both with Afghan refugees and with drug runners who have been fighting a low-level war with Iranian border guards. Iran itself has a history of sponsoring terrorism in the Middle East, and although its intelligence ministry is under the control of reformist President Mohammed Khatami, the security apparatus is not. But the government condemned last week's attacks in the U.S. (it was silent after the African embassy bombings in 1998). Says a senior Administration official: "The U.S. and Iran obviously have something of a common enemy in the Taliban," while another confirms that there are "openings" to Tehran.
Of late, the Taliban's major support has come from Pakistan, a self-declared Islamic republic in which Islamic radicals--who want to end Indian rule in Kashmir--have become increasingly influential. On roads in northwestern Pakistan that border Afghanistan, signs advertise training camps run by jihadis: FIGHT IN THE WAY OF ALLAH, FREE COMMANDO TRAINING. Any substantial action against Afghanistan would need Pakistani cooperation. That's why the crucial meeting last week was between Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Mahmoud Ahmad, the head of the powerful Pakistani InterServices Intelligence department, who was visiting Washington. A senior Administration official says Armitage gave Ahmad a set of demands that were "eyeball peeling," including the rights to overfly Pakistan's territory (important if the U.S. is to use the two aircraft carriers it has in the region), a full exchange of intelligence and the use of its ports. "You're either 100% with us or 100% against us," said Armitage, according to the senior official.
In Islamabad, top military and intelligence officials in the government of President Pervez Musharraf held a series of intense meetings. They sized up their options and decided to throw in their lot with the Americans, despite concerns over the reaction on the street. Pakistani officials, sources say, realized that the U.S. action against bin Laden was likely to be "massive and indiscriminate" and saw little reason that their own nation should want to be collateral damage. Musharraf, said Rifaat Hussain, a defense expert at an Islamabad university, "can either swim with the international current or sink with the Taliban." The decision to back the U.S., sources say, was made easier by a growing Pakistani frustration with the Taliban. Islamabad supported the regime hoping that it would bring peace and stability to the region, but the war with the Northern Alliance continues, as does a destabilizing flow of refugees and arms.