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For all its seeming decisiveness, military intervention is fraught with long-term complications. Going in would be easy; getting out would be hard. Pacifying the Haitian military could be done quickly; disarming bands of antidemocratic thugs could be a nightmare. Restoring Aristide to power looks simple; re-establishing his authority might be impossible. Dismantling Haiti's junta should take just hours; erecting a democratic alternative could take years. "Conquering the Haitian army is not a serious military challenge," says a Navy officer who works with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "The serious challenge is what we do after that. It's tough to come up with a good exit strategy."
Officials familiar with Pentagon planning speculate that the U.S. could opt for what the military euphemistically calls a "nighttime insertion" along the lines of the 1989 invasion of Panama that toppled Manuel Noriega. Thousands of troops, mostly pulled from the Army's 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions and Marine forces, would sweep onto the island under cover of dark. They would detain Haiti's military leaders and disable their communications network. Little resistance would be anticipated since the Haitian army numbers only about 7,000 troops and its arsenal amounts to a handful of armored personnel carriers and five tanklike, armored reconnaissance vehicles. "We can finish up their military by dawn," says an official. That may be a bit optimistic. U.S. troops went plowing into Panama thinking they would seize Noriega within hours; the effort took more than a week. In Somalia American G.I.s lost 18 men trying unsuccessfully to capture warlord General Mohammed Farrah Aidid.
Once in control, thousands more U.S. troops would fan out across the impoverished island to distribute food and medical supplies and pacify the countryside. Military officers predict that this part of the operation could involve something on the order of the 25,000 troops used in Panama. They reason that after the debacle of the U.S.S. Harlan County last October, when 193 U.S. soldiers retreated in the face of pier-side taunts from a few pistol- wielding thugs, Clinton would not want to leave any doubt about U.S. military strength. "Because we've got no credibility anymore," says a / Pentagon officer, "we need more force than we might otherwise require." Meanwhile, airplanes would fly over Haiti, transmitting messages from Aristide to Haitian televisions, paving the way for his return.
That could pose fresh problems. The country's elite and businessmen question whether Aristide truly aims to foster Haiti's democratic inclinations or merely intends to supplant military rule with another version of authoritarian command. They also fear that Aristide's supporters will seek to punish the business community -- that is if the embargo doesn't ruin it first. Should tougher U.N. sanctions go into effect at week's end, Aristide may once again feel pressured to find a nonmilitary solution. "Aristide can't be a perpetual naysayer," says Larry Birns of the Washington-based Council for Hemispheric Affairs. "His popularity is fading on the island. He's now identified with the suffering going on."