It used to be a given of European political life that Germany, guilt-ridden by its wartime past, would not take a leading or controversial role in world affairs. The Federal Republic, it was said, was an economic giant and a political dwarf -- a state of affairs that suited its neighbors very well indeed. Last week the dwarf suddenly raised himself to unprecedented heights during a tense debate within the European Community on how to deal with the six-month-old civil war in Yugoslavia.
Only a week after the Maastricht summit, hailed as a major step toward E.C. unity, the Twelve found themselves deeply divided over whether to recognize the independence of the breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia in the face of continuing attacks by the Serb-dominated national army. On the eve of an E.C. foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, the Germans were in a distinct minority in their push for recognition -- a move they said would deter further Serbian assaults. By the next day, in an unexpected show of diplomatic muscle, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had cajoled and bullied the European partners into partial agreement by threatening that Germany would act alone if they failed to go along.
The result was a compromise: the E.C. would recognize the two republics as of Jan. 15, but only if they pledged to respect human and minority rights, demonstrated a willingness to settle border questions and other disputes peacefully, and guaranteed a democratic government. The Germans immediately undermined the decision, however, by declaring their intention to recognize < Croatia and Slovenia even before the E.C. makes a determination on whether the conditions have been met.
Chancellor Helmut Kohl called the compromise "a great victory for German foreign policy." At the least, it spared the E.C. from an embarrassing public split, but there will undoubtedly be unpleasant repercussions for some time to come. British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, evoking World War I, reminded the House of Commons that "there is a tradition of the main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I don't think that tradition is a good one." One Conservative M.P. even complained about "the overmighty Hun."
Rarely since the end of World War II has a foreign policy issue had such an emotional impact on the German government and public as the crisis in Yugoslavia. One explanation for the strong German support of Croatia is that German unification in 1990 flowed from the very self-determination that Slovenes and Croats are now attempting to exercise. Another is that Germany has a built-in lobby in nearly 500,000 Croats living in the country. Millions of German tourists, moreover, have long enjoyed the Croatian coast as a kind of central European Riviera.