"The number of Americans killed will exceed tens of thousands if a ground battle occurs with Iraqi forces . . . which are trained in defensive combat to an extent that no other force in the world has reached."
-- Baghdad Radio
Boastful propaganda? Of course, but with just enough potential truth to haunt George Bush for days to come. The President, his generals and allies emphasized last week that he alone will make the fateful decisions whether and when to start a ground offensive -- a campaign that Baghdad Radio says Iraq "is waiting impatiently" to fight. But if he gives the go signal -- and it is increasingly difficult to see how he can avoid doing so -- he enters into a grisly calculus of death.
The body bags that became a repellent cliche of pre-Jan. 16 antiwar oratory, and that have been so remarkably scarce through the first three weeks of actual war, might pile up quickly, though probably nowhere near as high as Saddam Hussein's propagandists suggest. But how many soldiers' deaths are likely if the attack begins next week, the week after, a month later, two months later? How many Iraqi civilians might die in the meantime from U.S. bombing? What number of casualties, and over how long a period, can the U.S. stand without a disastrous loss in public support for the war? Conversely, how many more Iraqi civilian deaths, real or alleged, can the Arab world witness without an almost equally devastating accelerated swing to support for Saddam? And can the allied coalition hold together, especially if Soviet support softens -- as Mikhail Gorbachev's weekend statement suggests?
Officially, Bush has not even decided when he will decide. But all indications are that the first Rubicon has been seven-eighths crossed. The President asserted he is "somewhat skeptical" that air power alone can drive Saddam's forces out of Kuwait, and others were far more categorical. Lieut. General Sir Peter de la Billiere, British commander in Saudi Arabia, called a ground campaign "inevitable." No matter how devastating the air war has been, said Sir Peter, it is "minor, compared to what they've got coming."
The rationale for the land campaign -- driving Iraqi forces out of Kuwait -- by definition means seizing and holding ground, and that is one thing air power cannot do; only tanks and infantry can. Saddam could be overthrown by a coup, or he could suddenly pull his troops out voluntarily, or those troops could be so worn down that they surrender en masse. But a commander who bases his plans on any of those things would be taking almost as much of a chance as the restaurant customer who counts on paying for his dinner with the pearl he hopes to find in an oyster.
< If a land offensive seems certain, however, its timing and intensity are not. Much guessing focuses on late February or early March. French President Francois Mitterrand said flatly last week that the ground attack would begin "in the next few days, if not later, in any case sometime this month." But some Congressmen attending a closed-door briefing by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Colin Powell last week came away with a different impression. As Democratic Representative John Spratt of South Carolina put it, "I didn't get the sense anybody is pushing for a hurry-up ground war."