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Not everyone agrees. "It's possible that the West can work with Assad to make a better Mideast," says a senior Western diplomat in Damascus. What is not in dispute is the notion that, with or without the West's friendship, Assad would jump at the chance to become the unrivaled leader of the Pan- Arabists following Saddam's fall. Considering Assad's success in asserting Syrian control over Lebanon late last year, his room to maneuver already appears greater than it was before the crisis erupted.
SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES. Once Saddam is defeated -- assuming he is -- the Saudis and their gulf neighbors will enjoy only momentary relief. Saddam's easy conquest of Kuwait showed how vulnerable Saudi Arabia is to aggression, a weakness that must be redressed.
Some improved arrangement for collective security is sure to be worked out, possibly within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council, created in 1981 to promote economic integration in the region. But even if Saudi Arabia and the gulf states pool their resources, they will remain weak. Egypt could, in exchange for vast infusions of aid, agree to field large numbers of troops to help defend these countries.
Egypt's help, however, will not be enough. Security arrangements with the U.S. will undoubtedly be strengthened. As in the past, King Fahd and the gulf Emirs will seek to make those ties as invisible as possible. There may be more ships just off the coast; large caches of American tanks, planes and weaponry will probably be maintained in the event that U.S. troops must return in massive numbers.
In bolstering those ties with foreigners, the gulf and Saudi rulers must carefully balance external threats with internal ones. Even the smallest step toward the Western camp risks a backlash from the religious right, especially in puritanical Saudi Arabia. From the beginning of the gulf crisis, there have been ominous rumblings in the Saudi mosques -- and indeed throughout the Muslim world -- about the apostasy of having infidels defend the country that is host to Islam's holiest places. There could be increased demands on the oil sheikdoms to share more of their wealth with poorer states in the region.
A related worry is that the presence of Western forces has encouraged local proponents of democracy to press gently for more openness. The progressive reforms expected in a liberated Kuwait will bring still more pressure on the Saudis. Religious hard-liners would resist such moves, perhaps violently, thereby adding to the pressure on the Saudi royal family.
ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIANS. Both have much to win and much to lose in the gulf confrontation. Israel's gain would be the defeat and containment of its strongest Arab foe. Its loss -- at least in the eyes of many citizens -- would be heightened pressure, from the U.S. among others, to resolve the Arab- Israeli conflict by giving the Palestinians a homeland. If that does not happen, the Palestinians, having lined up behind Saddam Hussein, will find themselves poorer, weaker and more alienated than ever before.