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The diminution of the colossus of the East can only ease the minds of the nations of Eastern Europe that are slipping out of its political grip and those of Western Europe that have fearfully armed against it since the end of World War II. Amid the rejoicing, however, some cautionary notes are in order. A fragmenting giant with an immense nuclear arsenal must be carefully watched for signs of instability. That would be particularly true if the U.S.S.R. unraveled to a point at which a Russian chauvinist republic might control it. Such concerns are real, if premature. As William Webster, the director of the CIA, testified in Washington last week, it is possible that Gorbachev's enemies could one day try to oust him. But for now, "those demanding an acceleration of reform still have the upper hand."
The epicenter of the Soviet secessionist quake is in the Baltic states, which enjoyed 20 years of independence before being re-annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 under a cynical deal between Stalin and Hitler. As a result, says Sajudis president Vytautas Landsbergis, Lithuania "is not seeking to establish independence, but working to restore it." Visiting the republic in January, Gorbachev tried to apply the brakes with an offer to create a new Soviet federation with increased autonomy for all republics. While every republic had a constitutional right to leave the Union, he said, a law on secession procedures first had to be passed in Moscow. Give autonomy a chance, he urged, pointing out, "You have never lived in a federation."
Lithuanian leaders denounced Gorbachev's arguments as "trickery" and pressed ahead. The republic's Communist Party organization had already declared itself independent and moved closer to Sajudis in an attempt to build some credibility among the voters who now would decide its future. Last month the local parliament declared its 1940 accession to the U.S.S.R. "unlawful and invalid."
While the Baltics have a special claim to independence, visible fault lines have appeared among several republics as glasnost allowed the non-Russian peoples to speak their hidden thoughts and demokratizatsiya opened the door to new organizations and popular movements. National fronts were formed in almost every part of the country to advance ethnic, linguistic and cultural causes. Marx and Lenin had held that life under socialism would submerge such differences in the sea of workers' internationalist unity. As has so often been the case, Marxist-Leninist theory was wrong.
Unity was enforced and nationalist ambitions suppressed over the decades with ruthless coercion by the KGB, supplemented by privileges for the local party leaders who carried out Moscow's directives. Under Gorbachev, the use of force inside the Soviet Union was discouraged, and the party's hidebound patronage system came under direct attack. By denouncing the government's "command-administrati ve" methods, Gorbachev hoped to invigorate the system and increase its efficiency.