(4 of 5)
For all the early success of its all-out spin-control operation, though, it is by no means certain that the Administration can maintain its momentum. The rise in Reagan's poll standings is the kind of rally-'round-the-President response that appears almost automatically at any time of intense concentration on foreign affairs, but usually disappears in a fortnight or so. Some aspects of the Administration's explanation of "what really happened" at Reykjavik seem inconsistent or even contradictory. Poindexter at first implied that it was Reagan who in effect brought the summit to an end by picking up his papers and walking out; later the White House amended that to say that Gorbachev reached for his briefcase before Reagan stood up in response. Poindexter, Shultz and others contend that they went to Reykjavik fully prepared for anything that might come up. Yet they admit, almost in the same breath, that they were surprised to find themselves in a detailed negotiation touched off by Gorbachev's unexpectedly sweeping arms-reduction proposals.
These points are scarcely of overwhelming importance in themselves. But they arouse skepticism at a time when credibility problems are already plaguing the Administration as a result of its alleged "disinformation" campaign about Libya and suspicions that the CIA has been aiding the Nicaraguan contras despite a congressional prohibition.
Critics already are raising some questions about the summit. Would confining SDI to laboratory research for ten years really kill all prospects of eventually deploying the defense shield? Reagan is on record that it would. Not all experts agree, but at the very least the ten-year proposal would give the Soviets more of a chance to catch up with U.S. technology. Are both sides absolutely clear on just what it was that they almost agreed to in Iceland -- specifically, would the near-deal on strategic weapons have eliminated only ballistic missiles or bombers and cruise missiles too? In either case, should the deal be revived, how would the Administration defend the U.S. and its allies against an overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional arms without a nuclear deterrent? Shorter range, how can the Administration contend at the same time that it needs Star Wars to bring the Soviets back to the summit and + that it will never consent to bargaining away SDI?
It is this last question that most troubles critics in Congress who doubt that an effective defense against missiles can ever be built. In their view the program's value is precisely to serve as a bargaining chip. But Reagan's reluctance to use it is likely to intensify pressure in Congress to cut appropriations for SDI research even further below Administration requests. (The $3.5 billion appropriation for fiscal 1987, which began Oct. 1, is only about two-thirds of what the President had requested.) That movement will be all the greater if the Democrats win control of the Senate next month, a strong possibility that the summit outcome has not changed.