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In one sense, the Soviet campaign is a mirror image of the Reagan Administration's p.r. blitz. It sought to pin the blame squarely on the U.S. for blocking a deal that Gorbachev said could have constituted a "turning point in world history." In his TV speech the Soviet leader at times took a condescending, almost derisive tone toward Reagan, portraying the President as a confused leader "demonstrating his complete ignorance and misunderstanding of . . . the socialist world." But Gorbachev was as insistent as any Reaganaut in denying that the summit had failed. Said Gorbachev: "The work that went on during the meeting will not be wasted . . . We have cleared the path toward developing further struggle for peace and disarmament."
By week's end the Administration had reason to believe that its publicity campaign was paying off. In a poll for TIME by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, 45% of the respondents thought Gorbachev was primarily to blame for the failure to reach agreement at the Iceland summit, while only 14% said Reagan was mainly at fault. A thumping 69% said the President was right in refusing to restrict Star Wars as the price for a deal that would reduce nuclear arms. Day-to-day surveys taken for the White House by Richard Wirthlin showed Reagan's general approval rating jumping sharply from 64% just before the summit to 73% by last Tuesday night.
That seemed to defuse what otherwise might have been sharp criticism from Democrats campaigning for next month's congressional elections. Missouri Lieutenant Governor Harriett Woods, a liberal running for the Senate, contented herself with this bland comment: "I'm not saying the President should have accepted (Gorbachev's offer). I do think that the Administration must now define SDI's purpose more clearly."
Overseas, the governments of Britain, West Germany and Japan all expressed strong public support for Reagan's stand at Reykjavik. Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone chose to stress the progress made toward an agreement that would slash the number of Soviet SS-20 missiles targeted on his country rather than the failure to conclude the deal. Said Nakasone: "This progress . . . was made possible first of all by the unity of countries in the Western camp."
Such comments have a tinge of self-interest: the British, West German and Japanese governments have all signed up to participate in Star Wars research. But European leaders like West Germany's Helmut Kohl have other reasons to be glad that the final package was rejected. Kohl and his advisers were surprised by the sweeping nature of the proposals that, almost at a stroke, would have changed the military and nuclear balance of Western Europe. In private, they were frankly relieved that they still had time to look at the fine print of the offers rather than waking up to find they were back in an era of conventional warfare.
Nonetheless, much of Western Europe's press and expert opinion appeared to be impressed that the superpower leaders were at last talking seriously about deep slashes in nuclear arms. Even the antinuclear European left generally declined to indulge in Reagan bashing. In the Netherlands, the Inter-Church Peace Council deplored a "historic chance that was missed," but chastised the Soviets for linking reductions in intermediate-range nuclear weapons to restrictions on SDI.