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As the pressure for sanctions increased last month, Thatcher twice sent her Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to Pretoria. His mission: to seek the release from prison of Black Leader Nelson Mandela and the "unbanning" of the African National Congress, the exiled black political movement, in the hope of heading off sanctions. Howe was rebuffed at every turn, both by black leaders angered at Thatcher's refusal to consider sanctions and by the government of State President P.W. Botha for "direct interference" in South Africa's affairs. By mid-July, Kaunda was threatening to leave the Commonwealth if Thatcher remained adamant. Reports were even circulating that Queen Elizabeth II, the titular head of the Commonwealth, was worried about the possibility of its breakup.
Thus last week's meeting opened in an atmosphere of apprehension. On the first day, the seven leaders listened attentively to reports by Howe and the Eminent Persons Group, a body headed by former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser and General Olusegun Obasanjo, the former Nigerian head of state, which was appointed by the Commonwealth last year to study the South African dilemma. Most of the leaders present were struck by the degree to which Howe agreed with the group. Kaunda, who had publicly criticized Howe during his African mission, praised the Foreign Secretary's remarks as "simply fantastic."
Next day the group got down to hard work. Thatcher repeated her view that sanctions were "immoral" and impractical. But then, in the interests of Commonwealth solidarity, she offered her modest concessions. Though her proposals did not amount to much, and indeed were not supposed to, they did represent a policy change of sorts. Thatcher balked at any tougher measures, like a ban on air links with South Africa; the London-Johannesburg route is a highly lucrative one for government-owned British Airways. When she turned down Hawke on a boycott of South African farm products, the Australian sputtered, "I'm all for unity, but if it's a question of unity or credibility, I'll go for credibility."
By Monday night it was clear that the two sides were still far apart, and the leaders returned to the conference room at 9 p.m. to put the finishing touches on their communique. All but Thatcher stated their support for the stronger package of sanctions and expressed "concern and regret" that Britain had not agreed. At a midnight press conference, Thatcher called the summit result "reasonable for all concerned." Her Commonwealth colleagues were less effusive. Said Gandhi: "It's not the Commonwealth that loses; Britain loses. It is not leading anymore." Pindling likened Thatcher's stance to that of a would-be rescuer who waits for the victim to drown before throwing a lifeline. Mugabe professed himself "utterly dismayed." Nonetheless, Thatcher had managed once again to buy a little more time, averting the immediate threat to the Commonwealth and forestalling any need to make a final decision on sanctions, at least until the meeting of European foreign ministers in mid-September. By that time the full extent of Pretoria's measures against Zambia, Zimbabwe and other African states should be clearer.