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Tweaking Gaddafi without defanging him may be like "wounding a dangerous animal," says Edward Luttwak, an analyst at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies. Even a former foreign policy adviser to President Reagan last week questioned the wisdom of sending in the Sixth Fleet. "It's all right to give Gaddafi a bloody nose," he said. "But if you do it without a game plan, what does it get you? If there is now more terrorism aimed at Europeans and Americans, what have you won?"
In some ways Reagan has managed to break the post-Viet Nam syndrome that has paralyzed U.S. foreign policy. Yet he is hardly free of its shadow. With the significant exception of sending the Marines to Beirut on an ill-fated mission 3/ years ago, Reagan has become the master of staging small shows of force, tidy little wars carefully calibrated to win public approval without costing too many American lives.
American ambivalence about its superpower mantle is illustrated by the fact that congressional doves, many of them fearful of being labeled "soft" because of their opposition to contra aid, rushed last week to applaud Reagan's easy victory in the Gulf of Sidra. Yet they shy away from the tougher issue: how to apply steady and vigilant force as part of a policy for dealing with Nicaragua. Smacking Gaddafi may be cathartic and quick. But if the U.S. is truly going to face its responsibilities as a superpower, it will have to find a way to grapple with threats that are far more difficult and dirty, especially those closer to home.