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To satisfy the onerous requirements of public relations both at home and abroad, Reagan had to find a pretext for sailing the Sixth Fleet into harm's way. But assuring free passage in international waters had only a little more to do with the actual reasons for sending ships across Gaddafi's line of death than rescuing American medical students did with invading Grenada in 1983; as pretexts go, it was about on a par with citing arms shipments to rebels in El Salvador in order to aid the contras in Nicaragua. Scoffed Senator Gary Hart of Colorado: "There is always some fig leaf being used."
By the same token, although the Nicaraguan incursion last week was very real, Reagan's decision to send $20 million in emergency aid to Honduras and to permit U.S. helicopters to ferry Honduran troops was very much a part of his larger struggle to rally congressional and public support for $100 million in aid to the contras. Set back by the House a week earlier, the Administration needed a win in the Senate to keep the aid package alive and unencumbered by too many strings. What better way of showing that the contras need help than to make the most of Nicaraguan troops crossing the border to attack the rebels in their Honduran sanctuaries? Speaking at a political fund raiser in New Orleans last week, Reagan was not subtle in his message: The Nicaraguan attack, he declared, was a "slap in the face" to those in Congress who voted against contra aid.
Administration spokesmen tried to transform public backing for standing up to Gaddafi into support for the less popular policy of aiding the contras. "Americans understand what type of people we have to deal with in this world," said White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan, speaking of Gaddafi, "and they expect that from time to time we as a great power have to assert our right. That has to carry over into the Central America issue. & Sure, contra aid is a divisive issue in a dirty little war, but it takes courage to do what's right in that situation."
It was difficult to tell how seriously the targets of Reagan's bellicosity took it. On the night the Sixth Fleet sailed from the Gulf of Sidra, a fireworks display in Tripoli commemorating the 16th anniversary of the departure of the British military from Libya turned into a celebration of Gaddafi's latest skirmish with the U.S. In Nicaragua citizens enjoyed Holy Week by going to the beach, apparently unconcerned about the battle raging along the Honduran border. Nor did the President of Honduras, Jose Azcona Hoyo, seem overly concerned that his country was being invaded. He too went to the seashore for a vacation. For that matter, Reagan made no attempt to maintain a crisis atmosphere; at week's end he headed to his California ranch for Easter, stopping in New Orleans on the way.
Gaddafi's navy was no match for the Sixth Fleet. But aside from having the U.S. seem to stand tall again, it was difficult to discern any long-term strategic policy behind Reagan's show of force. In fact, long-range policies are in short supply in this Administration. Reagan swats a fly here or a gnat there while ignoring the insects' breeding areas. Says the President's former National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane of last week's action: "I don't see the kind of strategic framework that would make it a new phase. It is more a case of reacting to events."