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In its new proposals, the U.S. also seeks to ban future "heavy missiles," such as any successor to the Soviets' mammoth ten-warhead SS-18. The U.S. MX would not be affected. A provision put in place by Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle to toughen up the U.S. offer would proscribe mobile ICBMs, such as the Soviets' SS-24s and SS-25s and the proposed U.S. Midgetman. The Pentagon has never been keen to build the Midgetman, which was mainly pushed by Congress and other nuclear strategists; the ban is considered a concession to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Perle, who have consistently taken a hard line on arms-control talks.
The U.S. showed no willingness to bargain away its Star Wars program. In his interview with the BBC, the President elaborated on his notion that SDI developments could be shared with the Soviets, on the theory that the world would be more secure if both sides had a shield against nuclear weapons. In his news briefing, he stressed that the new U.S. proposals still include what he called "defensive research." The challenge will be to define a level of SDI research and testing--the U.S. now refers to "experimentation"--that the Soviets would accept.
The U.S. proposal came in response not only to the U.S.S.R.'s September initiative, but to subsequent Soviet refinements that have emerged from a series of private talks between U.S. and Soviet negotiators in Geneva. In these "postplenary" discussions, Soviet negotiators have indicated that their original proposal can be interpreted in a way that is more acceptable to the U.S. As one U.S. official put it, "The thing is still somewhere between a sow's ear and a silk purse, although it's a tad less bristly now than it was a couple of weeks ago."
One major step the Soviets have taken in the past three weeks is to indicate that a quick interim agreement could be reached on INF weapons without resolving Star Wars or other issues. Karpov has given his imprimatur to a plan that deals specifically with medium-range missiles in Europe; until last week the Soviets have never conceded the right of NATO and the U.S. to deploy American weapons in Europe. The latest informal Soviet offer would allow the U.S. to base between 100 and 120 cruise missiles in Europe (nearly the number already there) to be accompanied by a reduction in Soviet SS-20 warheads within range of Europe. The entire U.S. Pershing II contingent in West Germany would have to be removed, however. In return, the Soviets would also freeze their Asian SS-20 force, partially allaying American fears that Moscow's Euromissiles would merely be shipped off to Asia--where they would threaten Japan, Korea and China--and could easily be returned to Europe in case of a crisis.
Though it sounds forthright, the SS-20 warhead reduction proposed by the Soviets is actually quite tricky. The Kremlin would like to retain a number of SS-20 warheads in range of Western Europe that would be equal to the number of warheads on the remaining 120 or so American missiles, plus those warheads atop France's and Britain's own ballisticmissile arsenals. Those countries, along with the U.S., insist that these are independent national arsenals that are not a part of the superpower balance. Another problem: the British and the French are in the process of adding warhead capacity to their current stock of missiles.