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The reason for such stepped-up activity is simple: deadlines are approaching. Secretary of State George Shultz is scheduled to arrive in Moscow this week to put the final touches on preparations for the summit. The British and other NATO allies have flinched at Reagan's attempts to play down expectations for progress on arms control, and there are indications that Gorbachev has ordered his negotiators to pull out all stops in seeking a general statement of principles or perhaps an interim accord on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) based in Europe. One American official remarked that it all reminded him "of what Dr. Johnson said about the prospect of being hanged in a fortnight: 'It concentrates the mind wonderfully.' "
In his televised briefing, Reagan noted that the Soviet proposal delivered to him in September by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze "had certain positive seeds which we wish to nurture." The President refused to discuss the details of his new response, but said, "I would characterize our arms- control position as deep cuts, no first-strike advantage, defensive research . . . and no cheating." One of the seeds picked up from the Soviets was setting the limit on nuclear charges at 6,000. Yet the U.S. proposal applies the 6,000 figure only to warheads on strategic missiles (submarine ballistic missiles and land-based ICBMs) and on cruise missiles launched from planes. % The Soviets would like to lump gravity bombs and short-range attack- missile warheads into that category; the U.S. has a significant lead in these weapons.
In addition, the U.S. proposes important subceilings: only 4,500 nuclear charges would be permitted on ballistic missiles; the other 1,500 could be deployed as air-launched cruise missiles, which the Soviet Union would like to ban outright. The 1,500 limit is noteworthy, since the U.S. has a clear edge in air-launched cruise missiles, and the Air Force has plans to buy more than 3,000 of the weapons. Of the 4,500 ballistic-missile charges, only 3,000 would be allowed on ICBMs, with the rest to be deployed at sea. The U.S. considers the big land-based missiles to be the most dangerous because their accurate multiple warheads can be used to launch a devastating first strike. The Soviets currently have a 3-to-1 advantage in ICBM warheads.
The U.S. proposal would freeze Soviet and American launchers in Europe at the levels reached by the end of this year. For the U.S., that includes 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles in West Germany and 32 cruise missile launchers in Italy, Belgium and Britain. The Soviets have approximately 270 SS-20 ballistic missiles aimed at Western Europe, each with the capacity for three warheads. Once the freeze is in place, the Soviets would have to scale their warheads down to the U.S. level.
Another controversial issue addressed by the latest U.S. plan is throw weight, a measure of the power of missiles to thrust warheads and guidance gear during an attack. The Soviets now have about 5.7 million kg of ballistic- missile throw weight, compared with the U.S.'s 2 million. The U.S. plan calls for substantial direct cuts in maximum throw weight in order to reduce the opportunity for "breakout," the ability of one side suddenly to increase its offensive capabilities.