(13 of 20)
Unlike Khrushchev, Brezhnev seemed to have no ideas of his own to contribute. He seemed to dramatize the truth of another joke making the rounds: "There can be no personality cult where there is no personality." Brezhnev was certainly no visionary, or even an intellectual. His strength was ^ that he was a man of unusual organizational ability. He also had a gift for compromise and was adept at maintaining a fine balance among different--even opposing--forces. He was an uninspiring leader whose illusion of strong and steady helmsmanship was mainly a scaffolding built by his subordinates.
Kosygin retained his role as Kremlin spokesman on foreign affairs, although his position was much weakened by Brezhnev's expanded authority in the field. Kosygin had risen and survived by pursuing a technocrat's career. Dry even by Soviet standards, free of personal foibles or idiosyncrasies, he was so ascetic that in New York, his daughter Ludmilla, armed with a long shopping list of her own, could not think of anything to buy that her father would want or need.
I believed that Kosygin, out of self-preservation, deliberately chose to avoid the many intrigues and power plays in the Kremlin. Later on, Brezhnev pushed him still further aside, and several times Kosygin submitted his resignation to the Politburo. Although there was little rapport between the two men, Brezhnev turned these offers down and continued to pretend respect for Kosygin while in fact ignoring his views more and more. Once Brezhnev took command of foreign affairs, he edged Kosygin aside altogether and moved Gromyko from the role of mentor and confidant to that of co-architect.
THE SIX-DAY WAR
On Sunday evening, June 4, 1967, I was with Fedorenko at Glen Cove. Over a glass of cognac we discussed the growing tensions in the Middle East. About 4 a.m. the next morning we got word that war had broken out between Egypt and Israel. Fedorenko said we should return to the Soviet mission immediately for instructions from Moscow.
Our first meeting was with the Egyptian representative, Mohammed El-Kony, a total mediocrity. He was cheerful, insisting that reports of Egypt's loss of its air force were inaccurate. "We deceived the Israelis. They bombed some of our false airfields, where we deliberately placed fake plywood airplane models. We shall see who wins this war."
I was far from sure his evaluation was correct, and I said as much to Fedorenko, who agreed: "One can hardly trust the Arabs. There is no limit to their stupidity. Let's wait and see what Moscow says."
In the Security Council, the figure who stood out was Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the American permanent representative, our vigorous and formidable opponent. Fedorenko and others in our delegation referred to him as a "slick / Jew who could fool the devil himself." But while they disparaged him, they envied his talents.
Goldberg insisted there be an immediate cease-fire. He informally suggested that the cease-fire be coupled with a pullback of Israeli and Arab forces (Syria, Jordan and Iraq had also begun operations against Israel). I advised Fedorenko to try to influence the Arabs to accept. He agreed, but El- Kony was adamant. I thought the Arabs were making a terrible mistake. They seemed to be quickly losing the war.