(11 of 20)
But Gromyko's annoyance with Fedorenko went further than deep dislike for his personal style--long hair, flashy clothes, bow ties, all of which clashed with the strict, official appearance Gromyko thought should be standard for serious men. Gromyko also envied his status in the Academy of Sciences. Fedorenko, like Yakov Malik, who later replaced him as Ambassador, detested Gromyko. But unlike Malik, who was a lion with his subordinates and a mouse with Gromyko, Fedorenko did not fear the minister.
By 1963, after the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev's view of Kennedy had changed. He perceived Kennedy as the one who had accelerated improvement of relations and as a man of strength and determination, the one thing the Kremlin understands and respects.
When Kennedy was shot, Moscow firmly believed that the assassination was a scheme by "reactionary forces" within the U.S. seeking to damage the new trend in relations. The Kremlin ridiculed the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald had acted on his own. There was widespread speculation among Soviet diplomats that Lyndon Johnson, along with the CIA and the Mafia, had masterminded the plot. Johnson was anathema to Khrushchev. Because he was a Southerner, Moscow considered him a racist (the stereotype of any American politician from below the Mason-Dixon line), an anti-Soviet, and anti-Communist to boot. Further, since Johnson was from Texas, a center of the reactionary forces in the U.S., according to the Soviets, he was associated with the big-time capitalism of the oil industry, also known to be anti- Soviet. He "smells oily," it was said in Moscow.
Almost a year later, in October 1964, there was an upheaval in our leadership--another palace coup against Khrushchev, this time successful. Americans invariably seek a single main reason for any important action. Soviets don't approach things that way. There were many reasons--all important ^ --why Khrushchev was evicted from power.
Bureaucrats had been alarmed over the new rules governing party organization that Khrushchev had virtually imposed. City and regional officials were to have more frequent elections and a tenure of no more than six years. Nothing could have disturbed functionaries more. They could no longer count on a sinecure as a lifelong career.
Khrushchev's revelation of Stalin's crimes antagonized the KGB. The military resented his decision to reduce excess manpower in the army, forcing a large number of officers into retirement. His adventure in Cuba had ended in disgrace.
If there was a last straw, however, it was probably his determination to order yet another shake-up of the party apparatus at the coming November plenum of the Central Committee. This time it was to involve not only mid- level apparatchiki but higher cadre as well. Thus he encroached upon the holy of holies, the sanctum of the ruling class. Khrushchev's meddling could no longer be tolerated.
Fedorenko told me what happened next. Mikhail Suslov and Alexei Kosygin were the prime movers against Khrushchev. Suslov seemed satisfied to be the party patriarch and main ideologist. Kosygin was happy to be Chairman of the Council of Ministers and play the major role in both domestic economic and foreign policies. But it was hard for them to agree on who should be First Secretary of the Central Committee.