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Gorbachev's signals to non-Soviet Communists have been similarly varied. To leaders of the Italian Communist Party, who regularly proclaim independence from the Kremlin and in pre-Gorbachev days were just as regularly denounced for it by Moscow, the message seems to be that all is forgiven. Gorbachev reportedly has told two prominent Italian Communists who met separately and privately with him on visits to Moscow that he recognizes their right to hold an independent view of how to apply Marxist precepts in Italy.
Far more important, Gorbachev has been making overtures to Peking about a Soviet-Chinese rapprochement. The Chinese have been polite but suspicious, stressing what they call the "three obstacles" to agreement: the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese occupiers of Kampuchea, and the stationing of as many as 52 Soviet divisions on Chinese borders. Gorbachev has shown no signs of removing any of those obstacles. Says one senior Chinese diplomat: "I think because Gorbachev is more flexible, he will be harder to deal with." His meaning: Gorbachev is likely to combine hard-line positions with just enough concessions on minor matters, and just enough public relations flair, to make those positions appear more reasonable than in the past.
To the leaders of the East European nations formally allied with Moscow, however, Gorbachev's message is clear enough: Toe the line. Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria last year had scheduled a trip to Western Europe in the interest of fostering closer relations with non-Communist countries. He abruptly canceled those plans after Gorbachev, acting for the ailing Chernenko, hurriedly visited the Bulgarian capital, Sofia, in December to confer with Zhivkov and, presumably, communicate Soviet displeasure. In dealing with the West, and the U.S. specifically, Gorbachev has not altered the line pursued by his predecessors in any substantive way. He has, however, taken a different approach to the atmospherics of the superpower relationship, going out of his way to preach detente. To many in the West, his prime effort appears to be detaching West European allies from the U.S. by making superficially attractive offers.
Not all have been adroit. Over the Easter weekend, Gorbachev proposed that the Soviet Union and the U.S. immediately stop deployment of intermediate- range nuclear weapons in Europe. The ploy was too transparent to work. The Soviets had essentially completed their missile buildup, and the U.S. was in the midst of countervailing emplacements; a freeze would have left the U.S.S.R. with a huge lead in warheads. Even the Dutch government, which earlier had waffled on accepting American missiles, turned down the idea.