An Interview with Mikhail Gorbachev

Candid views about U.S.-Soviet relations and his goals for his people

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It is hard therefore to understand why our proposals have provoked such outspoken displeasure on the part of responsible U.S. statesmen. Attempts have been made to portray them as nothing but pure propaganda. Anyone even slightly familiar with the matter would easily see that behind our proposals there are most serious intentions and not just an attempt to influence public opinion. All real efforts to limit nuclear weapons began with a ban on tests --just recall the 1963 treaty that was a first major step in that direction. A complete end to nuclear tests would halt the nuclear arms race in the most dangerous area, that of qualitative improvement, and it would also seriously contribute to maintaining and strengthening the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

If all that we are doing is indeed viewed as mere propaganda, why not respond to it according to the principle of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth"? We have stopped nuclear explosions. Then you Americans could take revenge by doing likewise. You could deal us yet another propaganda blow, say, by suspending the development of one of your new strategic missiles. And we would respond with the same kind of "propaganda." And so on and so forth. Would anyone be harmed by competition in such "propaganda"? Of course, it could not be a substitute for a comprehensive arms-limitation agreement, but it would be a significant step leading to such an agreement.

The U.S. Administration has regrettably taken a different road. In response to our moratorium, it defiantly hastened to set off yet another nuclear explosion, as if to spite everyone. And to our proposals concerning a peaceful space, it responded with a decision to conduct a first operational test of an antisatellite weapon. As if that were not enough, it has also launched another "campaign of hatred" against the U.S.S.R.

What kind of impression does all this make? On the one hand, that of some kind of confusion and uncertainty in Washington. The only way I can explain this is anxiety lest our initiatives should wreck the version of the Soviet Union being the "focus of evil" and the source of universal danger, which in fact underlies the entire arms race policy. On the other hand, there is an impression of a shortage of responsibility for the destinies of the world. And this, frankly speaking, gives rise again and again to the question whether it is at all possible in such an atmosphere to conduct business in a normal way and to build rational relations between countries.

You asked me what is the primary thing that defines Soviet-American relations. I think it is the immutable fact that whether we like one another or not, we can either survive or perish only together. The principal question that we must answer is whether we are at last ready to recognize that there is no other way to live at peace with each other and whether we are prepared to switch our mentality and our mode of acting from a warlike to a peaceful track. As you say, live and let live. We call it peaceful coexistence. As for the Soviet Union, we answer that question in the affirmative.

Q. What do you think will be the results of your Geneva meeting with President Reagan in November? What specific actions should the U.S. and the Soviet Union take to improve relations?

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