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Superpower Relations. The gulf war pitted not just Iraq against Iran but, on the sidelines, the U.S. against the U.S.S.R. Both superpowers have strategic interests in the area; neither will easily stand by if the other should make political gains there. Under the Carter Doctrine, proclaimed by the President last January, the U.S. is committed to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open; it would prefer to do so by diplomatic means, but it has little leverage in Baghdad or in Tehran. Though neither Iraq nor Iran made any attempt last week to interfere with shipping through the strait, the Soviets talked about U.S. "preparations for armed interference in the Persian Gulf," obviously concerned that, in case of a blockade, the U.S. might resort to military action. In Washington, officials expressed fears that if the conflict dragged on, the Soviets, who are Iraq's main armorers and who share a 1,250-mile border with Iran, would have a built-in advantage in case of internal complications in either country.
Regional Stability. The war brought cautious Arab support for Iraq, tempered by concern over possible retaliation by Iran. Yet despite their dislike for the Khomeini regime, the rulers of the conservative Arab gulf states were hardly happy with one more flash point in an area already troubled by the Arab-Israeli dispute in the west and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the east. An Iraqi victory would add a new name to the list of potential pan-Arab leaders, that of ambitious President Saddam Hussein, 43, who wants to make his country the dominant power in the gulf; defeat could bring him down. For Iran, the stakes were equally high. Khomeini was able to mobilize the nation at short notice. Repelling the Iraqis would probably strengthen his hold on the country for a while. Buckling under Iraqi pressure could invite fragmentation, perhaps even the dismemberment of Iran.
The threat of war had hung in the air since spring, when border clashes began to intensify and spread along the 760-mile frontier between the two countries. Traditional enemies, divided by ethnic and ideological differences, Iraq and Iran had come to a temporary accommodation in 1975 when Saddam, then Vice President, and the late Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi announced a frontier agreement during an OPEC summit in Algiers. The centerpiece of the accord was a change in the status of the Shatt al Arab, long a source of friction between the two nations. Under the Algiers agreement, the border was moved from the Iranian side of the disputed waterway to the middle of the estuary; in return, the Shah agreed to stop his support for Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq who had been battling the Baghdad government with increasing success. According to the Iraqis, the Shah also promised to return a parcel of disputed territory around Musian.