(6 of 6)
If the new man in the Kremlin follows Andropov's example, he will turn his attention first to his nation's considerable domestic problems. He will inherit an economy that is in only slightly better condition than the one that Brezhnev bequeathed to his successor. Andropov mixed greater calls for discipline with a handful of modest incentives, thereby raising national income by 3.1% in 1983. Better weather brought in an unusually large grain harvest last year, 200 million tons, compared with a low of 160 million tons in 1981. But the fundamental problems of industry and agriculture remain, and Andropov's reforms were at best stopgap measures. If his successor hopes to improve the Soviet economy in any fundamental way, he will have to take the far bolder step toward reforming the country's rigidly centralized bureaucracy.
In choosing Andropov to succeed Brezhnev, the Kremlin leadership had sought to steer a cautious course of transition and postpone the inevitable day when power would devolve to a younger, unseasoned generation. Defying an un written law of Soviet politics that control must be consolidated over years, Andropov sought in a matter of months to take charge and begin to rejuvenate the aging leadership. But he could not hold off the ravages of disease long enough to succeed.
As the cumbersome transition process was set in motion last week, the ruling elite faced some unsettling choices. It could choose an older man once more and take a chance on another short-lived regime, or it could yield to the younger generation. There was a third way, combining youth and age in a temporary partnership. For leaders little inclined to take gambles, each course carried its disquieting risks. —By John Kohan. Reported by Erik Amfitheatrof/Moscow and Barrett Seaman/ Washington, with other bureaus